THE INVISIBLE LOBBYISTS TAMAR LEWIN

THE NATION

JUNE 10, 1978 60 cents

UPSALA COLLEGE
LIBRARY
JUN 5 1978
EAST ORANGE, N. J. 07019

Michael T. Klare and Max Holland
RHETORIC & REALITY
The Yankee Arms Merchant

BRITISH IMMIGRATION
THE BLACK POLITICAL FOOTBALL
Susan Jacoby

KILLED WITH KINDNESS
FOREIGN AID REFORM
Alan Tonelson

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
THE BATTERED AGENCY
Mark Green & David Moulton

THE WELL-TEMPE[illegible]Y: II TED SOLOTAROFF

147737 AG2
UPSALA COLLEGE LIBRARY
E ORANGE NJ 07019
* 1278

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

survival is news

Boston, Mass.

Your disarmament issue [May 27] seems to me in its planning and presentation the most thoughtful, the most highly responsible act of journalism of our times.

Victor Weisskopf, as you quote him, is dead right. (Or life right.) "The reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons *must have absolute priority*. . . ."

As a former editor and now teacher of journalism I have often wondered how to make this priority—in terms of news—clear to those who direct the great instruments of information in the United States. One issue of *The Nation* cannot, of course, persuade these directors that they are neglecting or ignoring the most important human interest story in history.

But you have nevertheless started something and I urge you to keep it up not only during the U.N. Special Session but for as long as it takes to make disarmament a popular issue, the everyday front-page news and the lead item on radio and TV newscasts. . . .

James Higgins
Associate Professor, Boston University

corporate free speech

New York City

Melvin Wulf's reading of *First National Bank of Boston* v. *Bellotti* ["You and I and Corporate Management," *The Nation,* May 20] is unduly apocalyptic, and your readers should be reassured that it is not quite the "decisive victory for corporate power" he perceives. To be sure, the Court did strike down a statute designed to curb the expenditure of corporate funds by management for purely political purposes, and this is unfortunate. But the Court intimated that it might uphold a new statute dedicated to the same goal—provided that the statute (*1*) did not single out corporations from among other collective entities with comparable resources; (*2*) did not permit some forms of corporate advocacy while prohibiting others, and (*3*) did not identify a particular issue as a forbidden subject of corporate advocacy. . . .

The statute under review in *First National Bank of Boston* case failed each of these tests, and so the Court held that it impermissibly abridged expression that the First Amendment was intended to protect. It is important, however, to realize that the Court did not hold that "the First Amendment rights of corporations and individuals are identical," as Mr. Wulf asserted. . . . Indeed, the Court expressly declined to address what it called "the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment." Therefore, although the holding of this case is certainly disappointing, it does not warrant Mr. Wulf's despair. It is to be hoped that state legislatures will respond to this decision by enacting legislation that will meet the Court's new tests for restrictions on corporate political spending.

David H. Remes

New York City

My view of the significance of the *Bellotti* decision is based on my sense of the Supreme Court's politics. Mr. Remes's view is based on close textual analysis. I think that my mode of analysis is more accurate.

Melvin Wulf

author's query

For a biography of the American novelist, John O'Hara, to be published by E.P. Dutton, I should be grateful for information about him, including documents and copies of correspondence.

Frank MacShane
School of the Arts, 404 Dodge
Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027

Cover: Oliphant, Washington Star.

EDITORIALS

The Strategy of Inattention

Michael Klare and Max Holland remind us in their important essay on arms sales (see p. 689) that as the world's largest seller of arms we are in a poor position to press other countries to cut back on their own arms sales. If that was one of the factors that persuaded President Carter to stay away from the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, his absence then at least signified awareness of the problem.

Such embarrassment avoidance cannot, however, account for the low profile of the disarmament issue in the press. *The New York Times*, for instance, chose to carry its report on Mobilization for Survival's impressive rally —it drew more than 10,000 supporters, who gathered to publicize the U.N. deliberations—deep in the warrens of its Sunday paper.

Some subjects, we deduce, are too unpleasant to think about—among them, the plight of many Third World countries, whose frustration at big-power cold-war politics caused them to put the disarmament issue on the international agenda in the first place. Alan Tonelson suggests (see p. 686) that the recently buried Humphrey bill, whose purpose was to take the development of the underdeveloped world seriously by moving it out of the State Department, may have been a case in point. Even those who share the radical objection to foreign aid as being a cover for the maintenance of the status quo would agree that the Humphrey bill died not so much for reasons of openly deliberated policy as by way of strategic inattention.

On the home front, Mark Green and David Moulton (see p. 698) demonstrate how a little-known consumer protection agency almost expired from inattention, and it is Tamar Lewin's argument (see p. 695) that our most powerful lobbies have succeeded in manipulating legal loopholes to divert attention from their most critical activities. There ought to be a law—and if the Senate follows the House's lead there will be, and for the first time we may find out what these largely invisible lobbies have been up to. Attention must be paid.

Mondale's Magic Show

The lack of seriousness, amounting almost to frivolity, with which the U.S. Government addresses the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was set forth in the flat tones of Vice President Mondale when he offered the nations of the world American technology to guard their borders with the "eyes and ears of peace." This notion, though *The New York Times* played it big, was thrown out almost as an afterthought in a speech bristling with competitive superpowerism which *The Washington Post* accurately headlined "Mondale Attacks Soviets on Nuclear Arms Buildup."

What have we here? A revival of Robert McNamara's electronic battlefield plan for Indochina? A vast extension of the monitoring apparatus manned by American technicians which guards two passes in the Sinai and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

helped to bring about the Israeli-Egyptian truce after the Yom Kippur war of 1973? Or is this offhand proposal just the purest hot air, stirring the tinkling cymbals of the reviving cold war?

The Mondale offer, if it can be called that, comes at a time when borders at both ends of Africa are in an aggravated state of instability. In the north, Ethiopia has successfully dealt with the Somali attempt to take over the contested Ogaden region and has made striking progress in putting down the long campaign of Eritrea to establish its independence, both projects having elicited substantial help from the Soviet Union and its idealistic Cuban hoplites. In the south, the borders of Zaire with Zambia and Angola have again been shown as porous as cheesecloth to the rebels trying to separate the rich province of Shaba from the country ruled by that corrupt and inefficient chieftain, President Mobutu Sese Seko.

At this point it seems appropriate to subject the Mondale proposal to a bit of arithmetical analysis, a dash of cold numbers, before the euphoria of miraculous technology inflates all our breasts. We might start with the first appearance of the fantasy that an "infiltration barrier" could really work. That was the efficient-sounding term used by former Defense Secretary McNamara in a draft memorandum of October 1966, published in *The Pentagon Papers*. It described "a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile troops" that would run across the 17th parallel in Vietnam. This amalgam of the latest and hottest gadgetry, said McNamara, would cost about $1 billion and would require up to 20,000 soldiers to build and maintain it.

Enter the demon of scale. The barrier across the 17th parallel would have run 150 miles at most. Even that distance seemed formidable to McNamara. He doubted that it would be "fully effective"' at first but thought it might become so "in time." Perhaps in charity we should recall that when McNamara erected this electronic fantasy (as against the real thing, which never got built), his feet were rapidly chilling about that dreadful war; the futuristic fence seemed to him a nice clean way to show that "our sole aim is to protect the South from the North" as he gritted his teeth and plunged ahead in a war waged with its customary brutality.

Look now at the map of Africa and ponder the relative scale of the effort Mondale must have envisaged, assuming he meant a word he said at the U.N. Take just the borders between Zaire and the two countries from which the Shaban rebels infiltrated into their province (many of them not in uniform, by all accounts, which would seem to compound the difficulty of their electronic detection—or have our sensing devices become so sophisticated that they can sniff out the difference between a wandering peasant and an armed marauder?). Zaire's border with Zambia runs about 1,300 miles and the one with Angola stretches for 1,500 miles.

Rounding out the numbers for McNamara's DMZ barrier, and adding a bit for the subsequent inflation-sophistication factor, that "defensive" dream came to about $10 million per mile. Let's see: 2,800 miles times $10 million is . . . well, astronomical. But of course it would be worth every penny of it to protect that mineral-rich province of darkest Africa, the major source

IN THIS ISSUE

June 10, 1978

EDITORIALS

682 The Strategy of Inattention; Mondale's Magic Show; Dust on the Constitution
684 The Democrats Rig the Primary Rules — *Iric Nathanson*

ARTICLES

686 Killed with Kindness: Foreign Aid Reform — *Alan Tonelson*
689 Rhetoric & Reality: The Yankee Arms Merchant — *Michael T. Klare & Max Holland*
692 British Immigration: The Black Political Football — *Susan Jacoby*
695 Navigating the Loopholes: The Invisible Lobbyists — *Tamar Lewin*
698 Consumer Product Safety: The Case of the Battered Agency — *Mark Green & David Moulton*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

701 The Well-Tempered Story: Part II — *Ted Solotaroff*
704 A Form of Asking (poem) — *Mark Rubin*
705 Hanna: Airships; Irving: The World According to Garp — *Michael Malone*
706 The Diviner (poem) — *Ellen Bryant Voigt*
708 Dance — *Nancy Goldner*
709 Art — *Lawrence Alloway*
710 Indigenous Music — *Nat Hentoff*

Editor VICTOR NAVASKY
Publisher HAMILTON FISH
Executive Editor ROBERT HATCH
Literary Editor ELIZABETH POCHODA
Contributing Editor BLAIR CLARK

Copy Editor, MARION HESS; Poetry Editor, GRACE SCHULMAN; Theatre, HAROLD CLURMAN; Art, LAWRENCE ALLOWAY; Music, DAVID HAMILTON; Dance, NANCY GOLDNER; Architecture, JANE HOLTZ KAY; Advertising Manager, SUSAN ELLEN HEITLER; Circulation, GLORIA SANGSTER.

Latin America, PENNY LERNOUX; London, RAYMOND WILLIAMS; Paris, CLAUDE BOURDET; Bonn, C. AMERY; Canberra, C. P. FITZGERALD.

The Nation is published weekly (except for first week in January, and bi-weekly in July and August) by Nation Enterprises and copyright 1978 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel.: 212-242-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

Subscription Price: One year, $21.00; two years, $37.00. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign. Foreign subscriptions: equivalent U.S. funds.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give four weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts: All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION

Volume 226
No. 22

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of almost bankrupt Zaire's foreign exchange.

If we jump to the north of the continent where Ethiopia, with Russian and Cuban help, is resisting various irridentisms and insurgencies, we get down to more reasonable figures. The border between Ethiopia proper and Eritrea is a mere 650 miles, while the fuzzy line between it and Somalia runs for 1,100—only 1,750 miles to be watched over by Mondale's "eyes and ears of peace."

The Vice President, to be fair, cited in his UNSSOD oration only our experience in the Middle East, obviously having in mind the Mitla and Gidi passes. These narrow defiles are the routes which Egyptian armor has used in the Arab attacks on Israel, and the terrain dictates that our technicians have only to peer at and hark to a front that is measured in yards, not miles. The relevance of this particular experience in narrow mountain valleys in a desert to the surveillance problem in the broad savannas and thick jungles of Africa escapes the most active imagination. Perhaps it defeated the Pentagon's fantasists as they tried to construct that part of the Mondale "disarmament" speech and that may account for the vague generality of his words.

The plain fact is that the American civilians manning those Sinai monitoring posts accomplish their purpose by their physical presence, not from the miraculous intelligence humming through their diodes. They reassure beleaguered Israel by offering American bodies as a kind of tripwire on the classic invasion route, and that is their only value to the "stability" of the Middle East.

Did Mondale and his speech writers have such an American presence in mind along the tens of thousands of miles of unstable borders on the African continent alone, not to mention Latin America and Asia? Or is all this complex equipment simply to be handed out to the world's "natives," so to speak, to operate or not as they and their rulers see fit?

If Evelyn Waugh had known about the technology of "eyes and ears of peace," and the casual way we have offered it to the world, he might have added a hilarious chapter to go with the croquet-playing British ambassador and his paranoid French counterpart in *Black Mischief*. But there is also the more real and serious possibility that our bluff might be called on Mondale's proposal and our clients throng to Washington, order books in hand. Then where would we be—up the Niger, the Congo and the Zambesi without a paddle? Odd as the whole proposal is, there is a dangerous side to it. A major power should not be fostering illusions about the world's security, flaunting its technical gimcrackery.

Instead, why not try disarmament?

Dust on the Constitution

Was it a "blow for freedom" when the Supreme Court ruled that the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) would have to get court warrants before it could make spot inspections of safety conditions in the American workplace? So said the head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and his colleague of the National Association of Manufacturers hailed the decision as "good news." In a revealing coincidence, on the very day of the Court's decision the President's economic advisers ordered OSHA to delay the release of a long-promised ruling on acceptable standards of dust in the cotton mills, on the ground that it might have an inflationary effect. They thought that the President himself might have to make the Solomon-like decision between the "health" of the economy and the health of some 800,000 millworkers.

The business of this country is still what Calvin Coolidge said it was—business. It is certainly not health. And so the protection of the Fourth Amendment's ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures" has been extended to employers in their places of business. OSHA will have to go to court to make inspections leading to enforcement of health and safety standards as and when they are established.

There is a real conflict here between opposing values.* It might be called a clash between the Constitution as the protector of all our liberties and the constitutions of industrial workers. It is the workers who will pay for the reinforcement of the Fourth Amendment's barriers against the government's intrusions into citizens' lives. They will pay with their well-being, their irreplaceable health, for whatever further delays the court ruling will bring to the cleaning up of the factories. As Sol Stetin of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union said of the delay of OSHA's dust-level ruling, "A safe level of cotton dust is economically feasible and morally imperative." How feasible and how imperative remains in question, and the same consideration applies to the ways OSHA will now have to operate to carry out its legal mandate in the nation's industrial plants. This is another reminder of the high price we pay for our basic liberties and of how unfairly that burden is shared. In the country's cotton mills, the 100,000 victims of dust-induced "brown lung" can reflect bitterly on the question of their own constitutions.

* An additional complication in the balancing of constitutional protections emerged as we went to press, when the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment gives newspapers no special right to advance warning of unannounced police searches of their offices.

The Democrats Rig the Primary Rules

Iric Nathanson

In 1975, Robert Strauss, then chairman of the Democratic National Committee, asked a group of party leaders to undertake a study of the Presidential primary system. For the last year, that group, chaired by Michigan Democratic chairman Morley Winograd, has been at the center of an internal party controversy that will come to a head in a few days when the Democratic National Committee meets in Washington on June 8 and 9. The DNC will act on a set of rules, written by the Winograd Commission and later revised by the DNC executive committee, to govern the 1980 Presidential nominating process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Winograd project, an attempt to streamline the primary system, was begun more than a year before the 1976 elections; it has since been redirected by the Carter White House. Carter operatives have sought to use the commission to clamp down on the reforms that have created a more open nominating process within the Democratic Party over the past ten years. Activists in the party's reform wing deeply resent this White House intrusion into internal party affairs. They contend that Carter staffers, who arranged to expand the Winograd Commission from thirty-two to fifty-nine members after the 1976 elections, are trying to rewrite party rules in order to head off a challenge to the President from within the party in 1980.

Most of the recommendations in the Winograd Commission's 116-page report, including one to shorten the primary period to three months, have generated little or no controversy. At the DNC's June meeting, the main item on the agenda will be a complicated plan to modify the party's proportional representation rules. At present, these rules enable Presidential contenders to acquire national convention delegates if they get at least 15 percent of the vote in primaries and state conventions. States may, if they wish, establish a threshold lower than 15 percent.

The Winograd Commission, at its final meeting in January, voted to recommend a new delegate appointment system in which the threshold would change over the three-month primary season. During the first month, under this so-called "sliding window" plan, a candidate would have to win at least 15 percent of the vote in order to obtain delegates. In the second month, the threshold would rise to 20 percent and in the third month it would go up to 25 percent. The "sliding window" was defended by Rick Hutcheson, a White House staffer who served on the commission, as a consensus-building device that would help narrow the party's choice for the nomination as the primary period progressed.

Hutcheson's arguments did not persuade a large group of party activists who mounted a campaign to oppose the "sliding window" earlier this year. In the face of significant pressure, the DNC executive committee voted in May to scrap the new appointment plan and adopt a proposal put forward by South Carolina Democratic Chairman Don Fowler. Under this plan, billed as a compromise, the threshold in each election district that selects convention delegates would depend on the number of delegates to be selected. Thus, the cutoff in a four-member district would be 25 percent, in a five-member district it would be 20 percent and so forth.

One reform leader acknowledges that the Fowler plan looks reasonable at first reading, but she says a second look shows that it increases the likelihood of "winner take all" primaries. Under the existing system, with a 15 percent cutoff, she explains, a candidate who gets 35 percent of the vote can win one delegate in a district that elects a total of three delegates. Two other candidates, each winning 30 percent of the vote, will also get one delegate each in this same district. Under the Fowler plan, with its 33⅓ percent cutoff in a three-member district, the candidate who gets 35 percent of the vote will win all three delegates, those who get 30 percent being shut out entirely. The reform leader says that this arrangement clearly works to the advantage of incumbents and front-running candidates who want to maximize the opportunity for "winner take all" elections.

A study of the Fowler proposal by the Democratic Conference, a reform coalition, shows that there is little difference between the South Carolina chairman's plan and the "sliding window" proposal. According to Amy Isaacs, the group's executive secretary, the Conference applied both formulas to 1976 primary election results in 209 districts where Congressional district level election data were available and found that the "sliding window" and the Fowler plan achieved different results in only twenty-seven of the districts. In California, for example, Isaacs reports, Carter would have received twenty-two delegates under both plans, as compared to the forty-nine delegates he actually won in 1976. "With statistics like these," she says, "it is difficult to make the case that the Fowler plan is much of a compromise."

The Democratic Conference, a loose coalition of political action groups, liberal labor unions and women's rights organizations, will be lobbying actively to persuade the DNC to retain the existing proportionality system and to reject any attempt to raise the threshold. The conference's chairman, Rep. Donald Fraser (D., Minn.) makes the point that the party achieved consensus about the Presidential nomination in 1976 without resorting to artificial cutoffs.

"We reformers are now the conservatives," says Rick Scott, Minnesota Democratic chairman and a member of the Winograd Commission's reform group. "We are saying that the 1976 rules worked well enough and that change is not necessary. The more conservative people in the party are saying, in effect, that we must have change for its own sake." Scott is fully aware of the pressure the White House is exerting to push the rules changes through the DNC. "I keep getting calls from the DNC staff which I translate as calls from the White House," Scott says.

John White, the Democratic National Committee's new chairman, maintains that President Carter is not himself directly involved in the rules controversy. "The President has no particular interest in all of this, other than finding some way to shorten the primary process," White says. When pressed, White admits that his statement does not apply to the White House staff. "I didn't say that the *White House* is uninterested," White told reporters at the DNC executive committee meeting on May 9.

Rick Scott thinks there is a good chance that the DNC will reject what he views as the most objectionable of the proposed rules changes. "DNC members will be looking at the Winograd report from a fresh perspective," he says, "and they should recognize the unnecessary complications it will create for them."

If the DNC does block this attempt to stiffen party rules, it will be the first time that the National Party has shown its independence by effectively resisting pressure from an incumbent Democratic President. That in itself would be no small accomplishment. □

Iric Nathanson is a writer living in Washington who specializes in Democratic Party affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KILLED WITH KINDNESS

FOREIGN AID REFORM

ALAN TONELSON

A bill containing the most ambitious effort in seventeen years to overhaul the beleaguered U.S. foreign aid program died quietly early this spring. In the end it was a classic Washington battle over bureaucratic turf, the economic and political merits of the proposal counting less than the question of who in the federal government would win and who would lose. Some watered-down bureaucratic reforms may yet emerge from Congressional deliberations by mid-June, and the administration has recently come out with a modest aid reorganization plan of its own. But while they speak gamely of resuming the struggle in 1979, even the most optimistic supporters of foreign aid restructuring fear they have lost a golden opportunity to revitalize one of the least popular, most misunderstood, worst organized but potentially most important aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

The bill in question, the International Development Cooperation Act of 1978 (S. 2420), was Hubert Humphrey's last major legislative initiative, and when it was introduced in the Senate on January 25 its prospects looked bright. Jointly unveiled by Alabama Democrat John Sparkman, outgoing chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Clifford P. Case, the panel's ranking Republican, the measure was widely billed and supported as a memorial to Humphrey. Its co-sponsors included many of the Senate's most influential liberals—Kennedy, McGovern, Ribicoff, Church, Cranston, Clark, Bayh, Javits and Eagleton—as well as some key foreign policy conservatives such as GOP leader Howard H. Baker, Jr. of Tennessee and New York Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who owes his Senate seat largely to the shrill anti-Third World campaign he waged two years ago as U.N. Ambassador. The little band of Third World-oriented think tanks and private humanitarian groups comprising this country's "development community" fairly gushed over the Humphrey bill, and what was more important, the administration seemed to like it. A White House spokesman said the bill was "constructive and serious and we'll consider it carefully," and John J. Gilligan, head of the Agency for International Development (AID), which handles U.S. bilateral foreign aid, endorsed most of its main provisions. Three months later it was shelved by the Foreign Relations Committee, lacking enough support even to come up for a vote.

With hindsight it can be seen that the Humphrey bill's chances were slim from the start. Designed to replace the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, S. 2420 would have combined foreign aid programs that are now scattered throughout the federal bureaucracy into a new, independent agency, the International Development Cooperation Administration (IDCA), whose head would have reported directly to the President. Humphrey envisioned this new aid coordinator as the President's chief adviser on foreign assistance and development, and the government's number-one spokesman on these issues. As such, he would help to establish the economic development of Third World societies as a full-fledged goal of U.S. foreign policy, rather than the afterthought it amounts to today. Moreover, the permanence of the IDCA would have symbolized a long-term U.S. commitment to Third World development—something that AID's current dependence on Executive whim leaves very much in doubt. Other provisions of the bill, known as the "policy" sections, laid out guidelines that would have put the Congress and the U.S. Government squarely behind the idea that U.S. aid should focus on the world's poorest countries and the neediest people within those countries.

The big losers under this new arrangement would have been the State Department and the Treasury. State would have relinquished the bilateral aid programs administered by AID, along with responsibility for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. agencies; Treasury would have ceded the formulation of U.S. policy in the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the regional development banks. Both departments strongly opposed the Humphrey bill and their hostility ultimately shaped the administration's response. But rather than commit itself one way or the other on the International Development Cooperation Act, the White House decided to kill the bill with kindness. While professing to support the "thrust" of the Humphrey bill (as Under Secretary of State Richard N. Cooper told *The Inter Dependent* in an interview, April 6), administration officials worked hard behind the scenes to prevent the cause of economic development from gaining an independent voice in U.S. foreign policy making. "Their counterproposal is nothing more than a sop to the development community," said one veteran Congressional observer.

Senate aides knew from the outset just how radical their proposal was and had no illusion that the legislation would breeze through the Congress and right past the government's aid fiefdoms. Yet in the last months of his life, Humphrey himself, convinced that U.S. foreign assistance was floundering badly just when Washington's relations with the developing world were assuming new importance, pushed hard for his top-to-bottom reorganization of aid as the only way to shake the program out of its doldrums.

By any measure, and whether handled bilaterally through AID or channeled multilaterally through the U.N. and the development banks, U.S. foreign aid is in trouble. The fiscal 1978 budget provides $6.8 billion for foreign economic assistance, making the United States the world's largest aid donor in absolute terms. But when its official development assistance is seen as a percentage of GNP,

Alan Tonelson covers U.S.-Third World policy and development issues for The Inter Dependent, *a publication of the United Nations Association. His free-lance articles on national affairs have appeared in* The New Republic *and* The New Leader.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the country ranks only twelfth among seventeen Western aid donors, with a mere 0.25 percent of its output committed to aid, according to the latest figures available. In sharp contrast, Sweden earmarks 0.82 percent, the Netherlands 0.82 percent and Norway 0.71 percent. (The U.N. has set a target for aid donors of 0.7 percent of GNP, but the Carter administration has not adopted it.) Further, U.S. aid has dwindled dramatically since the early 1960s, when official American assistance hovered around 0.7 percent.

As if the numbers weren't bad enough, almost all the institutions currently dispensing foreign aid have fallen into disrepute both in Washington and among the American people. As Gilligan tells it, AID was a bureaucratic nightmare when he took over in early 1977; in a widely quoted remark that he has come to regret, the former Ohio Governor called the agency's staff "overaged, overpaid and over here." Gilligan had hoped that his candor would bolster AID's credibility when budget time rolled around, but its principal effect has been to confirm the impressions held by many not only in Congress but in the administration that AID can't be trusted with large sums of money.

The President wants to channel more U.S. aid into the multilateral banks; Executive requests for contributions to these institutions have jumped from $1.9 billion in fiscal 1978 to $3.5 billion in fiscal 1979. Most development experts regard the IFIs as effective aid instruments and their hardheaded lending policies would warm the cockles of any commercial banker's heart. Yet the banks are about as popular on Capitol Hill right now as South Korean lobbyists. Part of the problem stems from the controversy over IFI salaries, which many Congressmen think outrageously high. But more of it flows from the nature of the aid banks themselves. Congressmen in general simply dislike the whole idea of multilateral aid because they have no control over its use, and in recent years, amendments to IFI appropriations have tried to do everything from preventing loans to nations regarded as flagrant human rights violators to blocking bank aid to foreign palm oil and citrus fruit exporters that allegedly threaten U.S. producers. In fact, the United States is badly in arrears to some multilateral institutions, particularly the International Development Association, the World Bank branch that extends soft loans to the poorest developing countries. And the banks' position on the Hill is so weak that a recent draft Treasury study advised the White House to press them to halve their plans to expand lending by 10 to 11 percent annually, largely because Congressional support for such sums is nowhere in sight.

The Carter administration is acutely aware of these problems, and has been actively reviewing the foreign aid program for the better part of a year. AID has been the focus of this evaluation, with two recent government reports typifying the policy of significant but limited reform that administration thinking has followed.

Gilligan authorized an internal AID study that recommends decentralizing power in the agency and delegating more authority to staffers in missions in the field—in effect, endorsing the course on which he has already embarked. A much broader view of AID's woes was taken by a Brookings Institution study commissioned by Secretary of State Vance and headed by Lester E. Gordon, director of the Harvard Institute for International Development. The Brookings team agreed that administrative reform within AID is badly needed, but it contends that the agency's main problem is its crippling Congressional mandate, a bewildering hodgepodge of more than 150 confusing and often conflicting amendments, orders, injunctions and restrictions that has the AID staff swamped with paperwork and frequently causes a two-to-three-year lag from the time AID projects are proposed by field missions to the date when they get underway.

In the view of one prominent development expert, "AID operates in such a hostile environment that in self-defense most AID employees must spend a disproportionate share of their time insuring that no errors occur. . . . The net effect is that decisions are agonized over at length, avoided if possible, and any degree of daring or innovation is necessarily regarded with great suspicion. In AID, it has long been unforgivable to make a mistake." The Brookings experts also lamented the dominance of political over developmental considerations on the aid process and recommended abolishing AID and replacing it with a new bilateral aid agency independent of the State Department.

Senate aides say that Humphrey felt these steps ignored the aid program's biggest problem—the scant attention that the different U.S. agencies engaged in foreign assistance give to the task of Third World development. With the State Department generally viewing foreign aid as a way to win friends and advance U.S. interests, the Agriculture Department treating the Food for Peace program as a way to get rid of the country's agricultural surpluses, and Treasury inclined to see the multilateral banks as the financial institutions they started out as rather than the development institutions they've turned into, there is no agency in the U.S. Government single-mindedly devoted to ending world poverty or able to recognize that raising living standards and fostering growth in the less developed countries is a challenge that will take at least decades to meet.

From a foreign policy point of view, the approaches now being questioned made a good deal of bureaucratic sense. If U.S. bilateral has not been a roaring success in terms of development, it has provided a handy diplomatic tool and it's easy to see why State is eager to hang onto AID or any successor that may be created. The wish to keep a close eye on U.N. agencies and the development banks accounts for the State and Treasury positions on multilateral aid, though officials in these departments argue that their "experience" in handling international organizations justifies continuing the status quo.

As a result, Humphrey believed that the only way to move development to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns was to centralize all foreign aid activities under one roof and free this new agency from State or Treasury control. Explains a key Senate staffer, "It was hoped that a reasonably independent agency concerned with development would give you a new actor downtown to speak for development issues in the making of interna-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional economic policy."

By far the thorniest issue concerns the IFIs. As another Senate aide said, "We've tried to bring together in one agency the various instruments of our foreign aid. One cannot even begin to address this issue without bringing the multilateral institutions into this." But more than a desire for consistency lies behind this goal. Many foreign aid supporters charge that Treasury has done a terrible job of making the case for the aid banks before Congress, and note that in recent years multilateral aid has taken a much worse beating than requests for bilateral assistance. Harvard's Gordon claims that, "Neither State nor Treasury has the technical competence or exposure to backstop our involvement in U.N. organizations or the IFIs with sound, substantive arguments." A Senate staffer simply notes that development "tends to get lost in the shuffle" of Treasury's many economic interests.

Treasury officials respond that the department's reputation as a symbol of financial rectitude makes it the aid banks' strongest possible advocate, but this argument addresses a somewhat phony issue. The latest attacks on the banks have nothing to do with their financial positions, and not since the days of William Simon have their managerial policies been seriously questioned in Washington. Instead, Congress is challenging the very concept of multilateral aid, and it's squarely up to the administration to ask the House and Senate—and the American people as a whole—whether they support or reject the principle of international organizations administering aid programs without interference from donor governmens.

The administration invoked Humphrey's name when it announced its own aid restructuring scheme May 19, but the token reshuffling involved has little in common with S. 2420. Gilligan has been designated the President's and the Secretary of State's "principal adviser on development programs and policy" and "the Executive Branch's principal spokesman to the Congress on development assistance." But far from taking charge of all U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance, the AID chief will simply head a new interagency committee designed to coordinate more effectively aid programs that will remain in their present scattered bureaucratic homes. Senate staffers and Congressional observers note that despite the new setup, Gilligan stays under the State Department's thumb. More important, they stress that leaving the IFIs with Treasury has effectively "gutted" the Humphrey bill.

Says one exasperated Senate aid, "The Executive Branch has treated this as simply an issue of improving coordination. That doesn't do what we had in mind. If you really want a development agency with a certain amount of clout, you give it responsibility for all economic assistance activities. Our desire was to integrate U.S. development assistance programs, not coordinate them. Coordination often involves high-level officials exchanging misinformation."

Yet the Humphrey bill also faced stiff Congressional opposition, chiefly from Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), who replaces the retiring Sparkman as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee next year. Though he cosponsored the bill, Church had been preoccupied until recently with the Panama Canal Treaties debate and the Mideast jet sale, and is reportedly dead set against any bureaucratic overhaul of U.S. aid until he can devote his full attention to it. This prospect makes aid advocates cringe; despite an impeccable liberal record on foreign affairs, Church has long held doubts about the wisdom and effectiveness of foreign aid, wondering—as do many other progressives—if aid does more harm than good, and if it reaches those genuinely in need.

But Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D., Wis.), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, raised the hopes of some Humphrey bill supporters April 19 by attaching to House foreign aid funding legislation an administrative reform amendment that seems marginally stronger than the administration's plan. Zablocki's IDCA is still subordinate to the State Department and the amendment requires no specific bureaucratic reforms. Humphrey bill loyalists argue that the House legislation leaves too much to the President's discretion and note that, if he so chose, Carter could issue an Executive Order reorganizing aid to achieve the Humphrey bill's aims. The only way to guarantee this, they maintain, is to create a new statutory agency. Yet the Zablocki amendment does direct the White House to go beyond coordination and to consolidate U.S. foreign assistance to the greatest possible extent, and the Executive endorsed the proposal at the last minute. Some aid reform supporters view it as an acceptable compromise.

Church opposes even this and in a letter asked Zablocki to drop the idea. But the Wisconsin Democrat pushed ahead and the full House approved the measure. The conflict between the Senate and House aid authorization bills will have to be resolved in June, when the acts reach a joint Congressional conference committee. Whether the Senate will buck Church is anyone's guess.

Administration opposition was instrumental in killing the International Development Cooperation Act of 1978, but fate and a host of procedural obstacles played an important role. Humphrey's death was a major blow, as none of the bill's powerful co-sponsors displayed much interest in the measure after the initial publicity it garnered had faded away. Time also worked against the bill; Congressional committees had to act on all budgetary authorizations by May 15 and the protracted Panama Canal debate left the Senate with almost no time to consider a major overhaul of a multibillion-dollar program that represents a large chunk of U.S. foreign policy toward most of the world's nations.

Yet the Humphrey bill was by no means a panacea for all the ills plaguing U.S. foreign aid. It could not, for instance, have guaranteed an equal voice for development concerns in foreign policy decision making. Though not formally linked to the State Department, the IDCA would have had to operate under the general foreign policy guidance of State, and few in Washington doubt who would have prevailed in a clash between the aid agency and Foggy Bottom.

Nor would the Humphrey bill have fully answered a powerful criticism of the Left—that many Third World elites today use foreign aid to consolidate their own power while neglecting the needs of their people. True, the doc-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trine of aiding basic human needs—endorsed by the legislation and almost certain to pass Congress intact—emphasizes a direct attack on the worst aspects of Third World poverty. It may be able in part to bypass ruling classes in the developing countries, but in a world of sovereign states it's hard to see how governments can be avoided entirely in the aid process.

But these obstacles and problems also reflect inherent weaknesses of the aid program that can't be legislated away. Possessing no meaningful domestic constituency and most readily understood by the public as a give-away program that hasn't worked very well anyway, foreign aid will remain the unwanted stepchild of U.S. foreign policy until American officials come up with some compelling reasons for continuing it. Yet the very idea of government-to-government foreign aid is so new—dating only from the end of World War II—that the U.S. Government is only now beginning to accept the idea of a long-term, open-ended involvement in the chaotic economic affairs of the developing countries. Persuading the American people will take much longer. As National Security Council aide Samuel P. Huntington wrote several years ago, it's easier to explain why the United States should feed starving Indian peasants than why this country has an interest in helping the Indian economy attain an annual growth rate of 6 percent.

Moreover, the aid program deals with relatively weak countries that pose no immediate danger to the United States and therefore don't rank very high among its foreign policy priorities. The Panama treaties held up aid reform this time, but the crisis-prone nature of world affairs is bound to keep foreign aid on the back burner for years to come. If development is ever to be taken seriously by the United States, a persistent public education campaign and some strong Presidential leadership will be needed. And despite all his sympathetic trilateralist rhetoric, that is exactly what President Carter seems unable or unwilling to provide. □

RHETORIC & REALITY

THE YANKEE ARMS MERCHANT

MICHAEL T. KLARE and MAX HOLLAND

"The United States cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war." So Mr. Carter affirmed when he was running for President in 1976. Noting that U.S. firms supplied some 50 percent of all weapons traded internationally, he argued that America has a special responsibility to exercise self-restraint in this area. "If I become President," he told the Foreign Policy Association of New York, "I will work . . . to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in weapons."

In seeming fulfillment of this promise, Carter announced on May 19, 1977, that "the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an *exceptional* foreign policy implement, to be used *only* in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests." In accordance with this principle, he issued a series of guidelines designed to "restrain" U.S. arms exports. These guidelines were described by an administration official as a "historic" contribution to conventional [i.e., nonnuclear] arms control, but other observers were less impressed. In October 1977, the late Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey made public a study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress which characterized the new policy as a sham. Carter's May 19th declaration, the study notes, "created an expectation that actual sales would become much less frequent." But, it concluded, the administration "has yet to demonstrate a significantly reduced role for arms transfers as an instrument of United States foreign policy."

Public and Congressional mistrust of the President's "arms restraint" policy intensified in February of this year, when the administration announced its $5 billion plan to sell 200 advanced fighter planes to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. One opponent of the Mideast arms package, Rep. Clarence D. Long of Maryland, charged that the United States had become the world's leading "salesman of slaughter."

In response to mounting criticism, the administration has backed away from its earlier crusading rhetoric. In a recent speech to arms industry executives, Under Secretary of State Lucy W. Benson (she is charged with implementing Carter's arms restraint policy) suggested that "No one ever said that we should not be the largest [arms merchant]. The only thing is that we shouldn't be as large as we are. I have every expectation that we will remain the largest arms exporter for the foreseeable future."

It is of course all too easy to criticize a government for failing to carry out the promises it made when seeking office, but on this particular issue there were some signs that the President was, at first, sincere. In his first White House interview, he remarked that the National Security Council believed unanimously in "the necessity for reducing arms sales." Three months later, columnists Evans and Novak reported that administration officials were considering a reduction of 25 percent or more in the annual volume of arms exports.

Soon, however, the vested interests of the arms business began to make themselves felt. One White House official who followed the internal debate told *Aviation*

Michael Klare is director of the Militarism and Disarmament Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. Max Holland is an associate of the Center for International Policy, also in Washington.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Week and Space Technology that "Initially, the guidance was all predicated on finding ways to scale back on arms sales overseas. The thesis was that arms sales are all wrong, but now that has changed, and the guidance for preparing the options is fairly balanced. The people in the White House now realize there are valid reasons for selling arms." By mid-May 1977, when the new policy was made public, any plans for significantly reducing U.S. arms sales had been shelved, and Carter merely promised that export levels in future years would be lower than the figure for 1977—a promise which, as we shall show, was kept only by a dramatic juggling of the books.

What pressures, between January and May 1977, persuaded the administration to adopt a more "balanced" position on arms sales? Although we shall probably never see the transcripts of the internal White House debates on these matters, it is not difficult to identify the forces at work. As has been argued in *The Nation* (see Klare: "How to Trigger an Arms Race," August 30, 1975, and "Arming the Shah," January 31, 1975) and elsewhere, arms sales to the Third World are pushed by a combination of powerful economic, political and military factors. One can better appreciate the web of forces involved if one defines the arms trade according to its major characteristics:

Volume: U.S. arms sales have been rising at an astronomical rate. Orders placed under the government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program have leaped from an average of $500 million per year in the 1950s and early 1960s to nearly $12 billion per year in the late 1970s. Orders over the past six years (and including projections for fiscal 1979) come to an astounding $79 billion, or five times the total for the preceding *twenty* years. Furthermore, arms supplied directly by U.S. corporations under the Commercial Sales program are rising at a comparable rate, from $100 million per year in the 1950s and 1960s to more than $1 billion annually in the late 1970s.

The dramatic upsurge in FMS sales occurred in 1973-74—that is, at the moment when Pentagon spending on operations in Vietnam was dropping toward zero and when U.S. costs for imported oil were increased by 400 percent. Not surprisingly, arms exports were seen as a way both to prevent bankruptcies in the U.S. defense industry and to slow the tide of balance-of-payments deficits. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements noted in 1973, any restriction on such exports "decreases the potential contribution of sales . . . to strengthening both free world security and the U.S. economy and balance-of-payments position."

Sophistication: Not only is the United States selling more arms than ever before, it is also selling arms that are more *sophisticated* than ever before. Countries that once had to be content with obsolete hand-me-downs acquired under the Military Assistance Program are now buying America's most advanced missiles, aircraft and warships.

Most of this high-technology hardware is going to a handful of countries in the Middle East—principally Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although economic motives surely play a role here—the desire to recoup as many U.S. "petrodollars" as possible—it is obvious that political factors dominate. Ever since Henry Kissinger took charge of U.S. foreign policy, Washington has sought to eradicate Soviet influence in the Middle East and to establish an American dominion there. And just as Moscow used arms sales to gain entry to the Mideast arena, so arms sales have become one of the principal devices used to speed its departure. To encourage Israeli, Egyptian, Saudi and Iranian compliance with the emerging U.S. strategic design, Kissinger offered advanced arms to all major powers in the area, and followed each initial gesture of allegiance with promises of even more sophisticated arms as a reward for further cooperation. This use of arms as diplomatic "bargaining chips" has by now become entrenched in our geopolitical activities, and the Carter administration has lacked the will to challenge the rules.

Know-How: The United States is selling not only larger quantities of ever more sophisticated arms but also the technical skills (which many Third World countries lack) to operate and maintain them. Such services are normally performed by engineers and technicians employed by the companies which produce the arms and which agree to provide this expert assistance as part of their contract. The demand for skilled personnel is growing rapidly in the Persian Gulf area: according to a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee study, there will be 50,000 "white-collar mercenaries" in Iran by 1980.

The sale of technical military skills, which is specifically exempt from President Carter's arms restraint policy, plays an important role in Washington's Mideast policy by providing a form of political insurance. Since both Saudi Arabia and Iran are expected to be dependent on foreign technicians for the indefinite future, the United States retains a form of veto over what use is made of any U.S.-supplied arms. This degree of control was explicitly acknowledged by then Secretary of State Rogers in 1973 when he suggested that, if Saudi Arabia transferred its U.S. jets to other Arab states for attacks on Israel, "it would only be a short time before they have problems because the planes require spare parts and maintenance that can only be done by our experts."

The Repression Trade: While most of the high-priced items in the U.S. arms catalogue are intended for interstate conflicts, an important segment of American military exports is consigned to the police and paramilitary forces of foreign countries, many of them under authoritarian rule. Such exports—which may be said to constitute the "Repression Trade"—include tear gas and riot-control weapons, small arms and ammunition, armored cars and police vehicles, surveillance devices, prison gear and torture instruments. Most of these items are supplied under the Commercial Sales program (administered by the State Department's Office of Munitions Control) and through Commerce Department channels. Unlike FMS orders, these latter are not subject to public disclosure and we cannot know their precise volume. However, it can hardly be less than several hundred million dollars (see Klare: "Exporting the Tools of Repression," *The Nation*, October 16, 1976).

Although Carter's much-publicized human rights policy would appear to ban the export of repressive technology,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Haynie, The Courier-Journal (Louisville)

the fact is that such sales are consistent with U.S. national security doctrine. Ever since the dawn of the cold war, it has been U.S. policy to help insure the survival of anti-Communist garrison states in key Third World areas. For twenty years, Washington provided direct assistance to the police and paramilitary forces of Third World governments through the Office of Public Safety (OPS) of the Agency for International Development (see: Klare: "The Reality Behind *State of Siege*," *The Nation*, December 10, 1973). OPS was abolished by Congress in 1974—largely in response to pressure from human rights organizations—and since then such support has been provided by U.S. arms firms on a cash-and-carry basis. Although the State Department has recently blocked sales of police hardware to a few of the more notorious human rights violators, it continues to allow purchases by other notable offenders, including Iran, Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines, on the ground that such deals are needed to insure the buyers' support of U.S. security objectives.

These are but some of the major aspects of the arms trade. Any meaningful program of "arms restraint" would have to address not only the procedural questions of arms control but also the underlying forces which have driven U.S. military sales to their present level. Carter's May 19th guideline barely touched the first and ignored the second altogether.

As for the reduction in arms transfers, Carter promised only that future commitments under the FMS program would be less than the fiscal 1977 level of $11.2 billion. However, these lower totals would be arrived at without references to: (*1*) sales to the NATO countries and Australia, New Zealand and Japan; (*2*) corporate deliveries through the Commercial Sales program, and (*3*) training, construction work and technical military services. Since these categories account for approximately 50 percent of U.S. military exports, the net effect of the reduction is, to say the least, unimpressive. And since sales in the last two categories are rising, *total exports* are actually exceeding the 1977 level even though there has been a reduction in the nonexempt category. Thus in fiscal 1979, the administration will impose a ceiling of $8.6 billion on nonexempt exports—down 8 percent from the comparable figure in 1978—but *total* military exports will rise to a record $13.5 billion!

Other aspects of the Carter policy are similarly diluted by waivers and exemptions. In the area of sophistication, for instance, the President has pledged that the United States "will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability." That is a sound enough principle, but there's a catch: it can be overlooked in "extraordinary circumstances," when the President determines that "countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance." This discretionary power has already been invoked to permit sales to Iran of the E-3A AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) radar plane—a system so advanced that CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner initially argued against its export on the ground that it might inadvertently fall into the hands of the Russians.

The sale of technical military services, not covered at all by the new guidelines, is expected to comprise an ever larger share of U.S. military exports. (In fiscal 1979, for instance, sales of construction services and other "nonhardware" items to Saudi Arabia will come to an estimated $3 *billion*!) Human rights are touched on in a vague statement that Washington will "continue to promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries," but no restrictions are placed on the sale of repressive technology to authoritarian regimes. Indeed, in a memo submitted to Congress on June 30, 1977, the administration counseled against the imposition of such restraints, lest they result in "offending such countries," thereby "incurring damage to our regional and global interests."

An assessment of the other guidelines would reveal other inconsistencies and contradictions. (For a complete analysis of the Carter policy, see Klare: "How We Practice 'Arms Restraint,'" *The Nation*, September 24, 1977.) But the real deficiency of the Carter policy is its failure to recognize the driving forces behind U.S. arms exports: ill-conceived perceptions of what constitutes our national security, and the increasing dependence of the U.S. arms industry on foreign military sales.

Korea offers a timely example of the first problem. To justify the withdrawal of U.S. troops that have long ceased to perform any meaningful role, Carter agreed to a $2.2 billion arms package to strengthen South Korean capabilities. It is to include much advanced gear and will give South Korea a significant combat advantage over the North. The result will surely be a renewed arms race and intensified South Korean resistance to a negotiated resolution of the area's problems. And notwithstanding U.S. attempts to secure the release of a few of the better-known political prisoners in South Korea, the arms deal implicitly endorses President Chung Hee Park's distorted view of the security situation and thus extends legitimacy to his dictatorial regime. Similar Presidential findings concerning the arms requirements of Iran, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan suggest that cold-war perceptions of "national security"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are untouched by Carter's professed commitment to human rights and conventional arms restraint.

No less a failure is Carter's lack of response to the increasing dependency of U.S. arms producers on foreign markets. The National Security Council study which formed the basis for the May 19th guidelines looked at considerable length into the domestic consequences of reducing U.S. arms exports, but the President's statement makes absolutely no mention of the problem other than to propose curbs on some of the hard-sell tactics that routinely accompany U.S. arms marketing abroad. Carter could have endorsed Sen. George McGovern's proposed "conversion" legislation (which would require major arms suppliers to develop standby plans for switching their military production lines to civilian use), but he failed to take even that modest step. In the absence of such legislation *any* President would have difficulty overcoming Congressional and constituent pressures for the preservation of jobs tied to the arms export programs.

Since the administration offers no effective leadership, any meaningful change in U.S. arms policies will have to come from the legislature. Unfortunately, Congress has been, until recently, unusually inactive in this area. It wasn't until June 1976 that a comprehensive arms sales statute was adopted, and even this measure—the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)—has thus far failed to produce any significant reductions in U.S. weapons exports. The AECA empowers Congress to veto major sales of $25 million or more, but while its use has been *threatened* occasionally—most notably to force the administration to reduce some missiles sales to Saudi Arabia and to remove some advanced cryptographic gear from the E-3As sold to Iran—this power has never been invoked to block a sale. The AECA has also deepened the secrecy that surrounds the Commercial Sales program, thereby preventing the public from monitoring exports of police equipment to foreign dictators.

Some Members of Congress are disturbed by the inadequacies of the AECA and have pledged to introduce substantive reforms. Sen. Robert Byrd, for instance, has proposed that all major sales require an affirmative vote by Congress, rather than the present arrangement, which places the burden on the legislators to veto the sales they disapprove. In the House, Rep. Donald M. Fraser has asked for tougher restraints on offers of police-type weapons to foreign dictators. But in a time of many other foreign policy issues—SALT, the Panama Canal Treaties, the Mideast—it is unlikely that Congress will accomplish much in this area without significant constituency pressure.

Fortunately, a new campaign has been launched to generate broad public support for Congressional initiatives. On April 21, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy released a letter signed by forty leaders of church, labor and human rights organizations calling upon Congress to "reassert and extend its authority over the executive branch's conduct of arms sales." The letter also calls for a fiscal 1979 ceiling of $8 billion on *all* categories of military exports—including services and Commercial Sales—to be reduced substantially in each successive year. A prohibition on arms deliveries for "internal security purposes" to governments which are "deemed to be in serious violation of human rights" is also proposed. This letter is based on a position paper and set of recommendations drawn up by the Coalition's Arms Sales Subcommittee (copies of which are available from the Coalition at 120 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20009).

In proposing new restraints on U.S. arms sales abroad, critics of current policies acknowledge that the trade in weapons is a global problem, and that any comprehensive control measures will have to involve all the major suppliers, including the Soviet Union. But proponents of restraint argue that it is unrealistic to ask other countries to curtail *their* exports when total U.S. sales continue to rise. They urge that there is no escape from the moral logic, first propounded by Secretary Vance on January 31, 1977, that "As the largest seller of arms, we have a particular responsibility to *first put our own house in order*." (Italics added.) □

BRITISH IMMIGRATION

THE BLACK POLITICAL FOOTBALL

SUSAN JACOBY

London

"Why aren't we in Monte Carlo or the fuckin' Hilton?" asks the leader of a group of young toughs in a south London school. "Must be someone's fault—tell us how the blacks done it."

"The blacks come over here and pinch our jobs," explains one of his friends. "They come from Africa mainly. Sometimes they buy a boat and sail here from India or Wogga-Wogga Land or wherever they live. . . . Don't tell me it don't make no sense—nothing makes sense."

This scene occurs in *Class Enemy*, a new play by Nigel Williams. Race is only one element in its portrait of the lives of many working-class kids—white and black—in a London neighborhood that is a dead end for many of England's urban poor—white and black.

But race and immigration of nonwhites were important issues last April in an election in a racially mixed area of London that might easily have served as the setting for *Class Enemy*. Brixton is a district of some 200,000 people, about two-thirds white and one-third black. The

Susan Jacoby, a free-lance writer, has spent several years studying recent immigration to the United States. Her book, The New Americans: Immigration in the 1970's, *will be published next year by Doubleday.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

black population has been well established since the early 1950s, when immigrants began arriving from the former British colonies in the West Indies to fill labor shortages in the London transit and sanitation systems. Many black residents of Brixton today are the children or even the grandchildren of those first migrants.

Brixton does not "look like a slum" to an American whose concept of a slum has been formed by the devastation of the South Bronx or Brownsville. It has grass, trees, houses with a solid middle-class air despite their faded, aging façades. But Brixton also has all the marks of a neighborhood in which people are trapped: Its unemployment rate is three times the national average; joblessness among youths is higher than in any urban area in England, and thousands of those ostensibly middle-class dwellings have no hot water or indoor toilets.

At the employment exchanges long lines of young men wait for what the British call "the dole." The proportion of black faces in these lines is higher than it is on the streets, but there are a great many white faces as well. Brixton is a community in which neither blacks nor whites are "making it" by English standards. Many older residents, white and black, stay in the area because they have lived there most of their lives. Young blacks, like their white counterparts, move to better neighborhoods if they get decent jobs.

White people tend to blame the community's troubles on the young blacks. "What you've got left here is the scum," a white grocer told me. "This is no place to bring up your family decently, now is it? The better element among the blacks, now they try to get out too. What you've got now is purse snatchings, attacks against women. No offense, but soon we'll have it as bad as you do in America."

In parliamentary elections, this low-income district normally votes overwhelmingly for the Labour Party. In the April by-election to replace a member of Parliament who had died, the Labour candidate won a predictable victory, but—for the first time in the history of the constituency—with less than 50 percent of the vote. The Conservative Party, which emphasized its proposals for new restrictions on immigration during the campaign, increased its share of the vote by more than 9 percent. And the neo-Fascist National Front, which has called for forced repatriation of blacks to the former colonies, edged out the Liberal Party candidate for third place. The results were a blow both to the Liberals and to the Labour government of Prime Minister James Callaghan.

Although blacks are a third of the population of Brixton, they account for only about 20 percent of registered voters. In the by-election, which had an extremely low turnout, they cast just 10 percent of the ballots. Blacks and Asians vote heavily for Labour. Their low rate of voter participation—linked with the transient character of poor neighborhoods—is comparable to the scanty voter turnout in many black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in Northern American cities.

In a general election, a shift of white votes comparable to that of Brixton would probably elect enough Conservative members of Parliament to drive the Labourites from office. There is, however, no guarantee that voters who registered a "one-issue" protest in a by-election would be willing to desert the Labourites in a nationwide election that could lead to a change in government. A national opinion poll showed strong support for tighter restrictions on immigration but also indicated that voters regard race and immigration as much less significant issues than inflation, unemployment and labor relations. Nevertheless, the results in Brixton are believed to rule out the possibility that Callaghan will risk a general election in the near future—unless he is forced to do so by a no-confidence vote in the House of Commons.

Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher has made repeated anti-immigration statements that have aroused fears in West Indian and Asian communities. She has called for specific changes in immigration policy that would make it much more difficult for legally settled immigrants to bring over their children, spouses or fiancés.

In a widely publicized television interview at the beginning of the year, Mrs. Thatcher asserted that there may be 4 million West Indians and Asians in England by the end of the century. This figure is not supported by current immigration statistics or birth rates, but Mrs. Thatcher's references to "4 million" seem designed to convey the same symbolic meaning as "forty" does in the Old Testament.

"Now that [the 4 million] is an awful lot," she said in her interview, "and I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in."

Mrs. Thatcher added bluntly: "Every country can take small minorities and in some ways they add to the richness and variety of this country. The moment the minority threatens to become a big one, people get frightened."

Although such statements get a favorable response in public opinion polls, Mrs. Thatcher's stance on immigration has drawn sharp criticism from some prominent members of her own party. Former Prime Minister Edward Heath pointed out that a serious issue of human rights is involved in any plan to restrict the entry of fiancés. "If we say people cannot marry a fiancé from abroad," Heath noted, "how are we going to criticize the Russians under the Helsinki Human Rights Convention when they do not allow these things?"

To an American, talk of being "swamped" by minorities that account for less than 4 percent of the population sounds ludicrous. In 1977, there were only 28,400 immigrants from nonwhite areas of the British Commonwealth—a drop from more than 37,000 who entered the previous year. Immigration restrictions have been steadily tightened since 1962, when the government enacted a measure specifically designed to cut off the flow of West Indians.

When the English use the term "blacks," they are referring to people of either West Indian or Asian origin. They may be talking about the recent arrivals from Bangladesh, India or Pakistan, refugees from Idi Amin's Uganda, the West Indians who arrived during the 1950s or the English-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

born and English-raised children of any of these immigrants. Everyone agrees that the word "black" crossed the Atlantic in the late 1960s, but the meaning of the term is completely different in England than in the United States. No American refers to our recent immigrants from India (who have been arriving at a rate of 15,000 to 18,000 a year since 1968) as "blacks."

The most reliable statistics (and they are not entirely reliable) suggest that blacks account for about 3.5 percent of the population of Great Britain. They are most heavily concentrated in the cities of southern England; by 1980, it is expected that blacks will comprise 7 to 9 percent of the population of Greater London. By American standards, a minority of this size could swamp hardly anyone.

But American standards should not be applied here. The essential fact about race relations in England is that the nonwhite population was minuscule before 1950. This means that many whites still regard the blacks in their midst as a bewildering novelty; *Class Enemy* did not exaggerate the confusion of many poorly educated young people (and their elders) about the origins of the black migration. I posed questions about the origins of "the blacks" to schoolchildren, beauticians, taxi drivers, shoppers in grocery stores and youths on the unemployment lines. When I tabulated the replies, I found that seventy-six out of 110 people were convinced that black immigrants (as distinguished from Asians) came from Africa. Most were surprised to learn that the overwhelming majority of blacks in England are of West Indian origin.

The relatively recent arrival of nonwhites also means that minority communities have not yet developed strong organizations and leaders to communicate their needs to the established institutions of British society. The lack of effective minority pressure is reflected in the attitudes of many whites who genuinely want to improve race relations in England: "white liberals" tend to speak of minority rights as a goal to be achieved by white noblesse oblige rather than by black action. England's anti-discrimination statutes, which in some respects are stronger than American civil rights laws, were products of that noblesse oblige. Says a former Labour Party official: "You might say it speaks well for the British character that such laws were passed when the government did not have to enact them as a result of minority pressure. Your American civil rights laws were born, you might say, out of the 'blood, toil, tears and sweat' of the people most affected by them—your own black people. There's something to be said for laws that come out of blood and sweat and not only out of principle, however right-minded that principle may be."

Some of the most widely publicized cases under Britain's race relations laws seem to focus more on form and politesse than on substantive issues of racial discrimination in employment, housing and education. In January, former National Front Chairman John Kingsley Read was acquitted of incitement to racial hatred in what the popular press called the "niggers, wogs and coons" case. In a speech in London's East End, Read had jokingly told his audience that he was under a civil injunction against making derogatory remarks about colored immigrants. "So you will forgive me," he said, "if I refer to niggers, wogs and coons." Read had also mentioned the death of an Asian youth and said, "one down, 1 million to go." He explained in court that he had not been advocating death for Asians but had simply been referring to the social problems that had been created by large-scale immigration.

His acquittal by an all-white jury, and the applause which greeted the decision in the courtroom, was not as startling as the judge's summation to the jury. The judge informed the jurors that he was once nicknamed "nigger" because he sang songs in an aboriginal language when he attended school in Australia. Years later, the judge recalled, he ran into an old school friend—a maharajah—in Piccadilly Circus. "I looked around and saw the maharajah's almost black face and said, 'Who are you calling nigger?' I can assure you neither he nor I intended any offense and that if there had been such a thing as a Race Relations Act in force we would not have committed any offense against it."

Several white staff members with public and private agencies that are part of what the English call "the race relations industry" expressed surprise when I said I found the judge's remarks far more disturbing than Read's speech. One earnest young woman was truly shocked to learn that Read's remarks would have been protected by the First Amendment in the United States. "How can there be any progress if people are not expected to keep a civil tone?" she asked.

Blacks, on the other hand, knew exactly what I meant when I said the attitude of a judge was more important than the attitude of the British equivalent of an American Nazi. "Institutionalized, unconscious racialism is the real problem in this country," said Simon Williams, a 35-year-old staff member of the Committee for Racial Equality. (The committee is a government agency established under the 1976 Race Relations Act.) Williams, who immigrated from the former colony of British Guiana (now the independent state of Guyana) in 1961, notes that the confusion—sometimes deliberate, sometimes unintentional—of "immigrant" with "black" is an impediment to an honest discussion of race relations in England.

"You can say you don't want any more immigrants and in many quarters it's regarded as a perfectly polite and reasonable position. It's not considered very respectable to say you hate blacks, even if you do.

"But when Mrs. Thatcher says 'immigrant,' what she really means is black. When she refers to 'the 4 million,' she means blacks—she isn't talking about the immigrants from Australia or Rhodesia. The real problems in this society are race and poverty, and the way the two intersect. The fundamental question is whether England will accept the fact that it is a multiracial society."

England is, of course, a multiracial society and will remain so regardless of any changes that may be made in immigration policy. It is too soon to tell how important a role immigration will play in a general election campaign, but it seems certain that Mrs. Thatcher will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continue to make whatever political capital she can out of the public concern over racial change. It also seems likely that the Labour government will apply the present immigration laws more stringently in an attempt to protect itself from Mrs. Thatcher's attacks.

It is not at all certain, however, that there would be a substantive change in immigration policy if there were a Conservative government. Putting Mrs. Thatcher's suggestions into effect would require the Tories to abandon promises about family reunification made by previous Conservative governments; many party leaders, like Edward Heath, are unwilling to do that.

Meanwhile, the public debate over immigration has moved to the Right and, in the opinion of blacks and white liberals, is impeding attempts to deal with the real problems of poverty, prejudice and racial discrimination. Those problems are difficult to escape in ordinary urban neighborhoods. Riding the underground back to the center of town from Brixton, I noticed a sign that read: "Crowds love wallets, purses, cameras. Watch yours." Some rider on the normally graffiti-free London underground had crossed out "crowds" and scribbled in "blacks." □

NAVIGATING THE LOOPHOLES

THE INVISIBLE LOBBYISTS

TAMAR LEWIN

Lobbyists have always been a secret force, hidden persuaders with an unsavory reputation. Last April the House of Representatives voted to make them disclose a wealth of information about the vast lobbying campaigns that sweep through Washington when any major legislation is being considered. The new law would make it possible to find out who pays whom how much to do what, information that the present outdated lobby law does more to hide than to reveal.

This isn't the first time Congress has taken a stab at reforming the lobby disclosure law. Two years ago, both the House and the Senate passed disclosure bills but they couldn't reconcile their differences by the end of the legislative session. This year, it looks as though the old law will finally be retired. The Senate is expected to pass its version of lobby reform within the next few weeks, and the new law should take effect by next year.

The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, passed in 1946, is so full of loopholes that only about one lobbyist in ten bothers to register, and those that do file disclosure reports rarely give a full account of their activities. Millions of dollars spent to sway Congressional votes on a bill may be ignored in the lobby reports or, through a narrow construction of what's to be reported, reduced to a $5 expenditure.

Lobbying is big business in Washington. Consumer groups do it; labor groups do it; citizen groups like Common Cause (for which I am a registered lobbyist) do it, but recently, business groups have been running the most elaborate lobby campaigns. Trade associations are now lobbying for every activity you can think of—honey producers, automative parts rebuilders, podiatrists and truck-stop operators each has its own group. And there's the National Caves Association, the Frozen Food Institute, the National Broiler Council and the American Pulpwood Association, not to mention the giants like the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, or the Business Roundtable.

Lobbying on the scale now practiced in the capital is a relatively new phenomenon. Until the New Deal, the federal government played a relatively small role in shaping the economic environment of the different interest groups, and few of them thought it worth their while to organize and lobby for special favors. As government has grown, however, economic regulations of one sort or another have proliferated to the point where they now touch almost every aspect of American life. The explosion of big government has been dramatic; since 1940 the federal budget has rocketed from less than $10 billion to more than $500 billion. Special-interest groups have kept pace: it is thought that more than 10,000 lobbyists now work in Washington.

The alliances among lobbyists are loose and constantly shifting. These used to form ideological fronts, but lately specific issues are the basis for coalition. The ad hoc groups that spring up to lobby together on an issue can map out sophisticated campaigns, with extensive budgets for mass mailings, newspaper ads, and several rounds of visits with Members of Congress, both by the lobbyists themselves and by prominent concerned citizens who either come to Washington or search out the legislator in his or her home district.

Right now, there is no way to find out much about such campaigns; the information available under the current lobby law is nothing more than a sham. Four times a year, some 3,700 of the Washington lobbyists fill out 2-page reports intended to show their receipts and expenditures. On the sixth floor of an old office building near the Senate two women in the Senate's Office of Public Records file and index the reports as they come in. And ten blocks away, on the other side of the Capitol building, the House Office of Records and Registration files its copies of the same reports.

Filing and indexing is about all the two offices can do. The staff does look over the reports to make sure all the appropriate blanks have been filled in, but the staff has no power to compel anyone to supply the missing data.

Tamar Lewin is an investigator for Common Cause and a free-lance writer based in Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Worse, the two offices are powerless to take action against lobbyists who fail to register, do not disclose fully, or consistently miss the filing deadlines.

Enforcing the lobby registration system is a chore assigned to the Justice Department, but its most recent prosecution of a lobby registration case occurred more than twenty years ago. The story of one bill now before Congress should make it plain that this failure to prosecute is no indication that the law is working.

For the last two years, AT&T has been waging a losing battle to make American telephone service a legal monopoly. In this, it has been joined by the independent telephone companies—a misnomer, since they are in fact quite dependent on Bell for all long-distance connections and much of their revenue.

After losing the first round at the Federal Communications Commission, and the second round in the courts, AT&T and the independents shifted the battleground to Congress, where they are trying to pass some pro-monopoly legislation popularly known as the Bell bill—though AT&T always refers to it by its official name, the Consumer Communications Reform Act.

Congress isn't the only scene of action. Like countless other groups interested in countless other bills, AT&T and the independents are working as hard to lobby the public as they are to lobby Congress. For example, they ran ads in the *Reader's Digest*:

> WAIT'LL YOU HEAR WHAT WASHINGTON, D.C. IS DOING TO YOUR HOME PHONE RATES
>
> You, the home phone user, will have to pay more for this essential service because of theories being spun by federal regulators. You see, there's a national debate going on. . . .

At various times since the fight started, AT&T has passed out pamphlets on the bill and even taken to the shopping malls where it distributed a little plastic pyramid puzzle with a small cardboard sheet plugging the Bell System:

> Like the pyramid in this envelope, [the Bell System] is deceptively simple and the temptation to alter its simplicity is undeniable. As you struggle with this puzzle, think of the difficult road back should the Bell System ever be broken up.

Supporters of the Bell bill have a glossy black lobby kit, complete with large and small ready-to-run newspaper ads, press releases, question and answer pamphlets, and a fill-in-the-blank community speech whereby telephone executives will persuade citizens to convince Congress to kill competition in the phone industry.

Soliciting others to lobby Congress is known as grass-roots lobbying, and the prefab telephone executive's speech is a good example, filled as it is with the usual combination of high-minded appeal and folksy touches:

> You know, I've been in the telephone business for (*insert number*) years (*note your family's long involvement, if appropriate*) but I think the next 10 to 20 years will see more revolutionary changes and advancements in communications technology than we've had in the last 50 years. . . .
>
> [But right now, the cheap home phone service that extends to 95% of American homes] . . . is threatened by actions of the Federal Communications Commission.

BIG LABOR
JAWORSKI CHARGE SO KOREA TRIED TO BUY OFF OUR CONGRESSMEN
GAS & OIL LOBBY
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
CASH FOR CONGRESS
CASH FOR CONGRESS

Sacramento Bee (Calif.)

"Ah'm Jus' Glad Ol' Leon Knows the Difference Between a 'Bribe' and a 'Contribution.'"

> The FCC is fostering what it calls competition . . . it's not true competition at all. . . .
>
> When you have studied this matter thoroughly, I urge you to write your Congressmen and your two U.S. Senators and tell them just how you feel about this issue. . . .

Supporters of the Bell bill have put together a list of some 300 civic and social groups that have passed resolutions in support of a telephone monopoly—no mean feat since most of the groups, like the Belles and Beaus Senior Citizen Club of Washington, the Volunteers in Aid of Sickle Cell Anemia of Pennsylvania, and the New Jersey Martial Arts Club, would have had no interest in telephone legislation but for the prodding of lobbyists.

According to reports requested by the FCC, AT&T spent more than $2 million on Bell bill lobbying in 1976, and more than $790,000 in 1977. However, AT&T has never registered as a lobbying organization, and the one AT&T lobbyist who does register as an individual doesn't report spending any money.

The case of AT&T and the Bell bill is not unique—except that this time the FCC found out how much had been spent. Very few major corporations register as lobbyists. A recent Common Cause study of energy lobbying found, for example, that none of the seven biggest oil companies was registered.

As generally interpreted, the current federal law requires disclosure only from a small set of lobbyists—those individuals and organizations that:

Lobby Congress. In the AT&T case, all lobbying aimed at the FCC decision would be left out, since the commission is not part of the leglislative branch.

Have as their primary purpose the influencing of legis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lation. Nothing AT&T does to lobby would be covered, since AT&T's primary purpose is not lobbying but telecommunications.

Do their lobbying by communicating directly with a Member of Congress. None of AT&T's grass-roots lobbying would be covered, since the puzzles, the bill stuffers, the pamphlets, etc., were not direct contacts with a Member of Congress.

In short, the restrictions in the current lobby law leave out the whole Bell bill lobbying campaign.

Most organizations that do register come nowhere near reporting their full expenditures; disclosure reports that list yearly expenditures of less than $20 are not unusual. Eugene Hardy of the National Association of Manufacturers, who stated an interest in a hundred different bills before Congress, reported spending $13.50 in 1977; David Branand of the American Mining Congress said he spent $11.80 that year on lobbying; William McKenna, a lawyer who lobbies on savings and loan legislation, invested a total of 90¢ on lobbying during the final quarter of 1977 —all of it in the category "travel, food, lodging and entertainment."

One lobbyist, when asked how he would possibly have spent less than $5 in three months of full-time lobbying, said, "It's a rare thing for me to be able to talk to a Member. That expenditure represents my taxi fare to and from the Hill the one time I actually got through to a Congressman. I don't think the law requires me to report how much I spend talking to staff people."

Even the large established trade associations report expenditures that represent a small fraction of their lobbying costs. The American Gas Association, for example, said it spent less than $40,000 of its $38 million budget on 1977 lobbying. Common Cause, with a $5 million budget, spent more than thirty times as much. In fact, Common Cause consistently ranks among the top lobby spenders, not because it has such a large program, but because it reports all organizational costs of lobbying.

It spends more than 80 percent of its lobbying budget on the grass roots. In lobbying for the new lobbying bill, for example, *FrontLine*, the Common Cause newspaper, asked all its readers to urge their Representatives to vote for the proposed legislation. The Common Cause national office also phoned its local steering committees to make sure they worked for lobby disclosure in the districts. It mailed out a discussion guide on the issue to all state offices and sent editorial memorandums to the editorial boards of 1,700 newspapers.

Campaigns to generate grass-roots lobbying are the major growth area in lobbying, since it has been found that the most effective way to pressure a legislator is to engineer a mass outpouring of opinion from constituents. As a businessman who helped lead the coalition that killed the consumer protection agency put it, "The paid lobbyist is still important, particularly in providing legislative intelligence, and he may pull the trigger—but the ammunition is out in the Congressional districts."

Working at the grass roots is expensive; Congressional staff members estimate that lobbies spend more than $1 billion a year on the letters, phone calls, computerized mailing lists, advocacy ads, and community meetings that are used to generate grass-roots response.

When the tools of solicitation are abused, the grass-roots campaigns can be deceptive. During the battle over the revision of the Hatch Act, for example, many Congressmen received a barrage of preprinted postcards opposing the changes. What they perhaps did not know is that the postcards were generated by a mass mailing from the gun lobby which warned that Hatch Act revision would mean gun confiscation. The postcards had virtually nothing to do with the senders' feelings about the Hatch Act.

And in the fight over the ban on artificial sweeteners, the major lobbying group was something called the Calorie Control Council—a group that turned out to be funded, not by Weight Watchers but by Coca-Cola, Pepsico, Dr. Pepper, 7-Up, Royal Crown, Nestlé, Life Savers and the Japan Saccharin Industrial Association.

In another grass-roots lobbying campaign last summer, a number of utility companies—none of them a registered lobbyist—sent out letters to all their shareholders, telling them that a section of the energy package before Congress would be a disaster for their investment. Some of the letters were simply one-sided; others, like this one from Mississippi Power and Light to a group of mayors were outright misleading:

> *The proposals will result in energy famine for the United States, exorbitant prices and ultimate nationalization of the energy industry.* When this happens, the free enterprise system which has made our country great *will be doomed.* It is just that serious!

Shortly after the letters went out, Members of Congress were flooded with constituent letters demanding that they vote against utility regulatory reform, including a time-of-day pricing provision that could have saved consumers a great deal of money.

Since none of this grass-roots lobbying campaign was reported under the law, the Members of Congress who received the letters had no way to know that they were hearing from shareholders, not from the customers whose utility bills would be smaller if the reform package were passed. And since they did not know how many people had been solicited to write in, they could not determine how spontaneous the response had been.

It would be wrong to restrict lobbying. The right to petition the government is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the government needs to hear the affected parties before forming its policy. Grass-roots involvement can help the government be more responsive to its citizens' needs.

But the danger of unreported spending should be obvious: even if lobbying pressures are not outright deceptive, the process is by its nature partisan and one-sided. If Congress considers auto safety legislation that would cost manufacturers millions of dollars, the manufacturers will have an economic incentive to spend heavily to defeat it. At the same time, the thousands of families who could be spared death or major injury if such legislation were enacted will not be organized to spend nearly as much to lobby for the bill.

To evaluate lobby campaigns effectively—and to under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stand the inherent imbalance between the pinpointed special interest and the more diffuse public interest—Congress and the public must find out what each side has done, and how much each has spent to frame the issue in its own interests.

The new bill passed by the House, and the one the Senate is expected to pass, would make this information available. Every organization spending more than $2,500 to hire outside lobbyists, or spending $2,500 and significant staff time to lobby in any calendar quarter, would have to register with Congress. Registrants would report their interests, their lobbyists' identities, their expenditures, their major organizational contributors, and their grassroots lobbying tactics.

If the Senate follows the House's lead, the hidden persuaders may soon lose their secret suasion. And for the first time, we would find out how much power they really have. □

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY

The Case of the Battered Agency

MARK GREEN and DAVID MOULTON

The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is a case study in how to give good intentions a bad name. Launched five years ago on a wave of overwhelming legislative support and impeccable purpose, it has drifted and plunged to overwhelming unpopularity ever since. A business community that still thinks the government should stick to running toll roads has consistently criticized its regulatory performance. But so have many consumer groups, dismayed by its lack of productivity and focus. And so has the Carter Office of Management and Budget, some of whose staff—not unmindful of the anti-government sentiment that helped Carter get elected—have urged in internal memorandums that the commission be abolished.

Ironically, at the very moment when criticism has coalesced to the point of threatening the very existence of the CPSC, there is a genuine potential for reform and rehabilitation. The resignation of an unpopular chairman, its first Democratic majority, and some internal restructuring may yet resuscitate this comatose body. The outcome, however, is still in doubt. As one CPSC commissioner said of the agency's Congressional overseers after a recent hearing, "They trash us in one breath and raise us up in the next."

In 1968, President Johnson appointed the National Commission on Product Safety to "conduct a comprehensive study and investigation" of the risks to consumers of hazardous household products. The conclusions of this panel were startling: 20 million Americans injured each year in the home as a result of incidents connected with consumer products; 110,000 permanently disabled; 30,000 killed; and an estimated cost to the nation in excess of $5.5 billion. The report found that "The exposure of consumers to unreasonable consumer product hazards is excessive by any standard of measurement," and recommended the establishment of a new, highly visible, independent product safety commission.

Mark Green is the director of Public Citizen's Congress Watch and the author or editor of several books on government regulation of business. David Moulton is an attorney at Congress Watch.

However, the business community and the Nixon administration opposed the unified agency approach, preferring a reorganization of existing programs within the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Congress brushed aside this effort to submerge and trivialize the problem of product safety; it approved a separate regulatory agency by a margin of 318 to 50 in the House and 69 to 10 in the Senate. But it then managed to design the commission in such a way as to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, compromising the powers of the agency almost to the point of paralysis.

In most regulatory agencies, setting a standard involves the publication of a proposed rule, invitation of public comment, consideration of those comments, and promulgation of a final rule. Courts rarely overturn this process, upholding the agency's judgment except upon the unusual showing that the agency has acted "arbitrarily" or "capriciously."

Setting standards at CPSC differs from this norm in two crucial ways. First, before the agency can proceed on its own, it must by law solicit offers from nongovernment groups to write a proposed product safety standard. The theory behind this so-called "offeror process" is to insure public involvement in the standard-setting process. The result, though, has been substantial delay as the outside consumer or business group—which, in the first instance may lack technical prowess, or in the second, have a self-interest in weak criteria—struggles to develop the standard, only to have much of the work duplicated when the CPSC staff reviews the submitted proposal. Although the Consumer Product Safety Act specifically provides that the entire process shall take no more than 330 days, a recent investigation by the Government Accounting Office found that the three standards issued to date took an average of 834 days to develop.

Second, there is a legal test that the commission must satisfy to rebuff challenges in court by an affected industry. Mandatory standards promulgated by the commission must be justified by "substantial evidence," according to the Consumer Product Safety Act, and that is a higher degree of proof than merely demonstrating that a stand-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ard is neither "arbitrary" nor "capricious"—language that applies to nearly all other agencies. On March 3, 1978, a federal court invalidated the CPSC's standard on swimming pool slides, the first mandatory standard issued under the offeror process. The court expressed frustration at the "legislative anomaly" of requiring that the CPSC satisfy a higher standard of proof while at the same time delegating so much authority in the process to outside groups. A portion of the commission's matchbook standard suffered a similar fate only four weeks later. These two standards together account for more than four years of work and were designed to help prevent an estimated 10,000 injuries annually.

Exacerbating these designed-in defects have been severe personnel difficulties. The agency's first chairman was Richard Simpson, a former engineering consultant who was deputy assistant secretary for product standards at the Department of Commerce before being appointed by Nixon to the CPSC. Simpson, who had previously testified *against* the concept of an independent product safety agency in hearings before Congress, never hired a permanent executive director in his three years at the commission. "He tried to do everything himself, without bringing in the other commissioners," says one high agency official. "We knew nothing." Because of his inability to set priorities, outside petitions dictated the commission's work. The ill-fated swimming pool slide standard, for example, occupied the early years of standard setting at CPSC simply because it was the first petition accepted—which is not to say that dangerous swimming pool slides are desirable, only that they were not the most urgent product safety problem facing the embryonic agency.

After serving an initial two-and-a-half-year term, Simpson waited fruitlessly for months for reappointment. Instead, President Ford finally submitted the name of S. John Byington, who turned out not to have been worth the wait. As the deputy in President Ford's Consumer Affairs Office helping plan to defeat consumer protection agency legislation, Byington was bitterly opposed by consumer groups who saw him as a Ford crony steeped in business and politics. But after twice rebuffing Byington's nomination, the Senate surrendered to the presumption in favor of Presidential regulatory nominees and confirmed him 45 to 39.

Byington began his term in May 1976 by proclaiming that "the age of infancy at CPSC is over. Three years is long enough to get your act together." But before the curtain fell on him two years later, Byington managed to perform in a fashion that made Simpson look good by comparison.

Although the agency's budget of $40 million is the third smallest of all the independent regulatory agencies, and tiny in relation to its broad jurisdiction, Byington recently admitted in a Senate hearing that 200 of his 900-person agency earned at least $28,755 last year. His yearlong reorganization project led to frequent charges of personnel abuse. An investigation by the Civil Service Commission carefully reported numerous instances of favoritism, misuse of consultants, and promotion of unqualified applicants. "Most of the violations . . . occurred as a direct result of actions taken or sanctioned by either Mr. Byington or Mr. Dimcoff [a former CPSC management chief]," the report concluded. Dimcoff resigned in November 1977. In December a GAO study reiterated the litany of CPSC failure: inefficient management, misplaced priorities, lack of enforcement, delays from the offeror process, and very few standards actually issued.

Then, in January 1978, Byington disclosed that the Justice Department was investigating allegations that a Los Angeles consulting firm, Terzian Associates, did free public relations work for him in return for government contracts totaling $17,000. Some high-level White House staff began discussing the possibility of attempting to remove Byington "for cause," a step no President had ever accomplished. Sen. Wendell Ford (D., Ky.), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's Consumer Subcommittee, called for his resignation. Finally, blaming "political harassment" and keeping one step ahead of the sheriff and of clamoring Congressional committees, Byington announced that he was submitting his resignation from the commission effective June 30, four months before the expiration of his term.

After five years of Republican dominance, the CPSC seems ripe for a revival. President Carter has brought in two new Democrats as commissioners—Susan King and Edith Sloan—and reappointed a third, David Pittle. And Byington's resignation leaves the chair vacant.

This combination of appointments made and to be made, plus the prospect of legislative reforms in the offeror process, has been enough to encourage many CPSC critics to hope for a new dawn. After all, when the Carter administration dealt with the even less popular OSHA and EEOC, it chose reform over abolition, selecting strong chairwomen with the mandate to clean up their agencies. So why not the Consumer Product Safety Commission?

But some in the administration had other plans. On March 2, a group of White House and OMB officials met in the office of Harrison Wellford, director of the President's Reorganization Project, to discuss a draft memorandum by OMB staffer Stan Morris on the future of the CPSC. After noting that the commission would need reauthorizing legislation this year and that the chairman was leaving in July, the Morris memorandum proposed that "serious consideration should be given to abolishing CPSC and transferring its functions to other agencies." FDA would be assigned product safety activities, while EPA would be given carcinogenic (cancer-causing) hazards. Justification for this proposal was threefold: (*1*) "reduce the number of agencies," (*2*) "streamline federal health and safety activities," and (*3*) "help overcome the often criticized piecemeal bureaucratic regulatory image." Incredibly, nowhere did Morris discuss the prospects for achieving vigorous product safety regulation in one bureaucratic framework rather than another. Nevertheless, despite strong expressions by some participants that this was a politically dangerous attack on consumers, there was substantial sentiment in support of the proposal,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and news stories of a White House move to kill CPSC began to appear. When one reporter later chided an OMB official for the administration's inability to cut down the size of the bureaucracy, he was told that OMB would soon move to abolish the CPSC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

In one sense an effort to abolish or dismember this consumer agency should not have been entirely unexpected. An administration pledged to reduce thousands of agencies to 200 felt the pressure to begin demonstrating its anti-bureaucratic *macho*. And even during the debate last fall on the proposed Office of Consumer Representation, the long knives were being drawn. As Rep. Pete McCloskey stated on the House floor, "I only regret that we were not able under the germaneness rule to abolish the Consumer Product Safety Commission." Several other Members have since privately warned CPSC commissioners that they were considering moves to end the agency.

But those in Congress specifically charged with monitoring the agency had a different idea. Wellford and Rick Neustadt of the White House met with Senator Ford, and were told that anything less than a three-year authorization was unacceptable to him. On the House side, Reps. Bob Eckhardt (D., Texas) and John Moss, (D., Calif.) chairmen of Congressional committees that oversee CPSC, both expressed dismay at the timing of the proposal and fired off a joint letter to the President. "The agency needs and deserves an opportunity to function during the period in which it has a majority of commissioners who are both able and committed to the mission of the agency," wrote Eckhardt and Moss. "To dismember it would be premature and ill-advised, coming as it does at a time when a new leadership team capable of shaping an effective regulatory program is just beginning to assert itself."

In Senate hearings in early April, all five commissioners appeared before the Senate Consumer Subcommittee to make their own defense of the battered agency and to support the reauthorization. All agreed that anything less than a three-year reauthorization would demoralize staff, cut off needed research, and make it impossible to hire or keep talented people. Of course, there would also be an effect on the commissioners themselves, two of whom President Carter had recruited just weeks before to help turn the agency around. "When I was asked if I would serve on the commission," said newcomer Susan King, "I was asked by the White House to make a commitment—to a full seven-year term. It is somewhat of a surprise to see [the Carter administration's] interest in less than a three-year authorization. . . . It's like getting on the *Amoco Cadiz* when its going to ooze out from under you."

Nearly simultaneous with these hearings, a "decision" memo was being prepared for President Carter containing three options—dismantle, two-year authorization, or a three-year authorization. Although OMB would have been comfortable either with dismantling or a two-year authorization, consumer affairs adviser Esther Peterson argued strenuously in a memorandum to Carter for the three years. And Peterson, who within the week was to be given added authority by Carter to influence administration policy affecting consumers, prevailed. On Monday, April 24, on the eve of committee markup, Rick Neustadt called Senate and House staff to inform them that the President had decided to support the three-year option.

Without Carter's support, the CPSC would probably have either been splintered or subjected to a punitively brief reprieve. Even so, problems remain. The saber rattling that accompanied the debate on the Office of Consumer Representation is bound to be heard again as the CPSC reauthorization goes to full House and Senate for a vote. Those who wish to reduce the number of agencies in government, regardless of their mission, and those who wish especially to eliminate the ones that annoy business, have been altered by the debate within the administration. They may yet have an opportunity to capitalize on it.

And there remains the important matter of making a timely designation of a new chairman. The lack of one for any substantial time will put the commission in the same state of limbo that occurred between the chairmanships of Simpson and Byington. Yet White House sources say that Byington's successor is not expected to be named "for some time."

Rather than conveying such mixed signals, the Carter administration could better redesign and expedite the slow-motion, standard-setting process and designate a competent and dedicated chairman to replace Byington. For what is at stake here is not merely reshuffling some organizational boxes in Washington but the lives of tens of thousands of Americans, many children, who are being killed or permanently injured by shoddy products.

The commission still has the potential to reduce this suffering significantly, and indeed has done so in several instances to date. For example, child-resistant caps on packages containing poisonous or toxic substances, required by CPSC regulation under the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, are estimated to have prevented 40,000 poisonings since 1973. An estimated 4,500 injuries and 175 deaths have been avoided since 1974 as a result of CPSC regulations requiring that cribs be designed to minimize the chance that infants will suffocate between the mattress and slats.

Such regulation is a necessary supplement to a tort system that permits recovery, if at all, only after injury has occurred. Nor can we depend on the free market to produce the desired results. As Philip Elman, former member of the Federal Trade Commission, has said, "The answer, very simply, is that competition and voluntary actions of businessmen do not always suffice to safeguard the public interest. Competition does not inevitably take the form of a rivalry to produce the safest product. Indeed, the competition struggle may sometimes lead to a 'shaving' of the costs of manufacture involving some sacrifice of safety."

Thus, to kill the CPSC would be, effectively, to kill people. That is perhaps why the administration finally relented and agreed to a three-year reprieve for this struggling agency. It now has time to prove that government can be humane and efficient when the marketplace fails to protect consumers. But then, says Senator Ford, "They won't have to say anything to me about dismantling it if it hasn't performed. I will be the first to dismantle it myself." □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Well-Tempered Story: Part II

TED SOLOTAROFF

The first part of this essay appeared last week. In its entirety it will be published as the introduction to The Best American Short Stories 1978 *edited by Mr. Solotaroff and available from Houghton Mifflin in October, and Bantam Books in the spring.*

Walter Benjamin's use of the term "story" corresponds more closely to what we would call a "tale": i.e., it has its roots in the oral tradition, its favorite domicile was the hearth or the workroom, its archetypal artists were the peasant, the seafarer, the artisan; for "it combined the lore of faraway places, such as a much-traveled man brings home, with the lore of the past, as it best reveals itself to natives of a place." Thus its province was not the here and now but the more philosophical one of the there and then. Its principal distinguishing feature, in Benjamin's view, was its heuristic value. It dramatized a moral, practical instruction, or the illustration of a proverb or maxim. In other words, the tale was spun into a useful fabric, one that provided counsel for its audience, "counsel" being understood, as Benjamin puts it, less as "an answer to a question than a proposal concerning the continuation [and significance] of a story which is just unfolding." And because such stories were typically drawn from the ways of the world, from shared or readily communicable experience, their counsel becomes "the epic side of truth," namely wisdom, which, like storytelling itself, Benjamin believes is dying out.

As I read Benjamin, then, the story is less an evolving art form than a continuing if fading cultural resource: a vehicle for communicating and passing on the wisdom of the race by evoking "astonishment and thoughtfulness." Though open to individual embellishment its nature is to be repeatable: hence the narrative line is clear and distinct: it introduces a situation, complicates it, and then resolves it. It does not depend upon psychological explanation for its coherence, its psychology is characteristically simple, uninflected, and it withholds explanation, part of its art, to allow the listener or reader to grasp its import by means of his own imagination and insight. Further, it is the lack of dependency on psychological nuance that contributes to, in Benjamin's lovely phrase, the "chaste compactness" of the story and enables it to be remembered and retold.

This "chaste compactness" is achieved by the craft with which the storyteller hews to the axial lines of character, tracing them through situations which test and illuminate them, thereby casting a glow on the manners, mores, and attitudes of the tribe, animated by a man's life process flowing through them. Benjamin frequently relates the story to "natural history," the disparate, variable, mutable ingredients and events of the world that nonetheless draw ineluctably and inexorably on to a predetermined end, which is, of course, death.

The storyteller is conversant most of all with death: his art—layer upon layer of transparent incidents moving both indeterminately (suspense) and inexorably toward a fixed ending—is derived from his feeling for natural history. Indeed, the older the storyteller, whether historically or personally, the more likely he is to identify his vision of life with nature and the "great inscrutable course of the world," and hence the more he will be in communion with the transitory and the mortal. But whether he is as early as Herodotus or as late as Nikolai Leskov, the 19th-century Russian writer whom Benjamin uses as his principal touchstone and source of examples, the signature of the true storyteller is found in the movement of his tale toward completeness, the sense it leaves of an earned definitiveness of experience, however open its meaning to speculation and mystery. In a remarkable passage Benjamin associates death and storytelling as follows:

> It is characteristic that not only a man's knowledge or wisdom, but above all his real life—and this is the stuff that stories are made of—first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his death. Just as a sequence of images is set in motion inside a man as his life comes to an end—unfolding the views of himself under which he has encountered himself without being aware of it—suddenly in his expressions and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts to everything that concerned him that authority which even the poorest wretch in dying possesses for the living around him. This authority is at the very source of the story.

Part of Benjamin's explanation for the decline of storytelling is that death has been pushed from the realm of domestic, lived fact to the periphery of our awareness by the ways in which we isolate ourselves from the dying and the dead. The point is typical of Benjamin's approach to the problem of the story. He does not concern himself with the arguments, familiar by 1935, that the conventions of plot are falsified by the random, provisional, indeterminate aspects of reality, that free-standing, solid, explicable characters, more or less bereft of an unconscious, are belied by psychology as well as our own inner life, that fiction with a moral in tow or designed to illustrate a maxim is immediately suspect of simplifying experience and subverting art. Since virtually all didactic fiction today is a form of propaganda for authoritarian systems, the form is doubly dubious. Of course, Benjamin would say he is talking about "counsel," not thought control. And he would attribute the decline of counsel and wisdom to the fallen value of experience itself, whether of the person or community or the race, its supercession by the bewilderment of man in the face of his incessantly changing society, of a world that has gotten out of hand and has passed beyond the human scale of understanding and judgment. Hence the story is dying because of the incommunicability and incommensurability of being-in-the-world. He points out that the men returning from World War I were silent rather than full of stories and the novels that were later produced were "anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth." What they communicated instead was mostly the enormity of modern warfare, the overwhelmment of the person. As he puts it,

> A generation that had gone to school on a horse-drawn street car now stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile, human body.

What are we to say forty-odd years later into the maelstrom that hardly requires war to reduce persons to social atoms? The mass society does that very readily, while its culture further under-

Ted Solotaroff is senior editor at Bantam Books and formerly editor of American Review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mines the communicability of experience by its various modes of pseudo-communication, the more pseudo, the better, as the TV ratings testify. Benjamin, who died in 1940, did not live to see his military image expand across the social spectrum, but he was already well aware of the media of information as a conquering adversary of the story. The product of the up-and-doing middle class with its preference for the factual and the explicable, the daily flood of information works directly against the function and value of the traditional story. Though drawing upon the ways of the world, Benjamin's storyteller is indifferent to the verifiability of his account and offers no explanations for life in the there and then. Like man himself, the imaginative interest on which his story does depend has diminished to the meagerness of the "news story."

One can see how the primacy of information over genuine narrative has penetrated and altered our reading habits by comparing the child's to the adult's way of taking in a story. Still relatively innocent of the penchant for news, the child's request to "tell me a story" is qualitatively different from his parents' "let's see what's in *The New Yorker* or *Ms.* this week." Like Benjamin's weavers at their looms, in which the rhythm of the work induces a receptivity to narrative—Benjamin calls it "self-forgetfulness"—the child, relaxed in his bed, creates a special state of attentiveness in which the story provides a passage from the day's activities through contact with otherness, preferably with a touch of the miraculous, that takes over his imagination and plays it toward sleep and redemption. The process is perhaps similar to the much more abbreviated, out-of-the-blue imaginings in an adult that presage that he is about to drop off.

But though adults also typically use bedside reading to put the day behind them and prepare for sleep, they do not open themselves to story in the way the child does. If an adult is reading a magazine and comes to a story, his mind-set does not alter and prepare to receive the rich and strange but rather slightly adjusts itself to assimilate a more indirect kind of information, presented in a more personal but often no more imaginative form than the articles: the way we live now, etc. Most magazines most of the time reinforce this tendency by providing stories that do not come from afar, whether in time or place, but are rather news from the private sector, usually in keeping with the magazine's characteristic interests, tone, and class image of its editors and readers. A few popular magazines such as *Esquire* and *The New Yorker* which are responsive to literature will sometimes publish stories that have little or nothing to do with the rest of the magazine, but the fictions of Barthelme, Borges, or Bashevis Singer no doubt seem esoteric to most of its readers and have the air of distant relatives or uninvited guests of the family. The fallen value of fiction for its own sake is particularly apparent when a writer's stories are brought together, published, and quickly sink without a trace, rivaled only by collections of poetry in their predictable lack of appeal to today's common reader.

The media are not, however, the only lethal impediments and adversaries to Benjamin's notion of the story. There is also the novel. It departs from the story at its very outset, its roots being not in the oral tradition but the printed word. The effect of this medium is, typically, to distance the reader from his audience: instead of a man among men, who "takes what he tells from experience—his own or that reported by others . . . and in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to the tale," the novelist keeps his narrative to himself and has to be his own audience until he is finished. Anyone who has successfully told a story to a circle of people, and then, encouraged by his performance and their responsiveness, has tried to write it, is aware of how the spontaneity and intimacy of the oral turns into the self-consciousness and loneliness of the written. It is partly this difference that Benjamin has in mind when he goes on to write about the novelist in what seems to be a rather arbitrary and extreme way:

> The novelist has isolated himself. The birthplace of the novel is the solitary individual, who is no longer able to express himself by giving examples of his most important concerns, is himself uncounseled, and cannot counsel others. To write a novel means to carry the incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life. In the midst of life's fullness, and through the representation of this fullness, the novel gives evidence of the profound perplexity of the living.

Defoe? Fielding? Or, even more notably, Dickens?—the writer whose novels took their place at the hearthside of countless Victorian households, who was so much the counselor that he loomed as the secretary and conscience of his society, whole fullness of presented life was so securely organized and intuitively understood that it provided his readers with intelligence rather than bewilderment: Benjamin's storyteller with endless staying power. But if one thinks about it, the further Dickens traveled in his career, the more his figure begins to take on the lineaments of Benjamin's novelist.

In the later novels like *Little Dorrit*, *Great Expectations* and *Our Mutual Friend*, the fullness of life burdens rather than elates, as it did the younger Dickens, while his faith in its center—the enterprising middle class—collapses and turns into despair and contempt. His later protagonists and spokesmen, such as Arthur Clennam, Pip, Bradley Headstone, far from being counseled, are respectively stifled, bewildered, consumed by hate. Instead of the élan of curiosity, wit and broad imagination, the relish in oddity, the confidence in the natural, the decent, the just, whose figures by and large win out, the later novels are driven by darker energies, a welling-up of the destabilizing, destructive, and perverse elements of society and character that lead toward the study of the demonic that was beginning to take form in the unfinished *Romance of Edwin Drood*. Instead of the sense of intimacy between Dickens and his characters, in the later novels he seems to stand alone, brooding over individual conditions and social forces that denature his people, isolate them, imprison them. Once his animal faith in progress, nurtured by the course of his own life as well as by the age, declined and turned mordant, he increasingly found life to be, in Benjamin's term, "incommensurable"—and his main recourse if he was to go on writing was precisely in developing an increasingly complex and centrally placed psychology. It is also interesting that as this development was carrying him beyond and against the expectations of his audience, Dickens developed a need that became obsessive to appear before them in public readings, as though sensing that while he was losing his hold on them through his published words, he might still regain it through his actual voice, reinvoking the mutual spell of intimacy through recourse to the oral.

And yet, and yet . . . Dickens continued to write stories to the end, short ones as well as the elaborately plotted late novels which remained his only way to organize and to some extent comprehend life's fullness and perplexity.

For Benjamin the term "short story," which he uses only once, is less a development of the traditional story than another example of the various abbreviations of the forms and processes of the past by the modern means of productivity. Rather than carrying on the craft

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LET'S HEAR IT FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT

[WHILE WE STILL CAN]

GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP is about to take a great leap forward.

A government agency—The Federal Communications Commission—believes it has the right to act as our parents and restrict the broadcast of certain words at times when children just *might* be listening—*regardless of any literary, artistic, or social value or the fact that this could seriously limit free expression in the broadcast medium.*

The FCC acted after WBAI—a listener sponsored Pacifica radio station in New York—broadcast a monologue by comedian George Carlin about "seven words you can't say on TV" which satirizes how people get uptight by the use of certain words.

Their mailbox clogged with *one* letter of complaint, the FCC ruled Pacifica to be in violation of the Federal Communications Act. In deciding that a government agency has the right to tell broadcasters what they can or cannot say on the air, they essentially trampled all over the First Amendment.

When Pacifica challenged this ruling, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that the FCC had overstepped its authority in banning "indecent language" at certain hours and that it had wrongly entered into "the forbidden realm of censorship."

Undaunted, the FCC has now taken the "Carlin Case" to the Supreme Court which will consider this critically important constitutional question: *Do all First Amendment rights traditionally enjoyed by free press also extend to radio and television?*

Opposing the FCC—standing up for the right to broadcast a free flow of information and your right to hear it—is Pacifica radio. Broadcasting for thirty-two years, Pacifica is known as "First Amendment Radio," unrestricted by advertisers and committed to the presentation of all points of view.

BANNED?

The Bible
Aristophanes
Shakespeare
Jonathan Swift
Ernest Hemingway
Dylan Thomas
Chaucer
Margaret Mead
George Orwell
Lord Byron
The Nixon/Watergate Tapes

What happens in the Carlin Case will not only affect Pacifica but the entire broadcast industry as well. And this, of course, affects YOU.

It's been a tough and expensive battle for us. . . . Now we're asking for your help. Your contribution to the Pacifica First Amendment Fund will help insure that one of our most basic freedoms—the freedom of speech—will remain intact. And, it will help us keep on broadcasting words that the government would rather not hear.

THE PACIFICA FOUNDATION
(a non-profit California Corporation)
WBAI 99.5 FM, New York, N.Y.
KPFA 94.1 FM, Berkeley, CA
KPFT 90.1 FM, Houston, Texas
WPFW 89.3 FM, Washington, D.C.
KPFK 90.7 FM, Los Angeles, CA
KPFB 89.3 FM, Berkeley, CA

THIS COUPON FIGHTS CENSORSHIP

YES! I want to help save the public airwaves from the obscenity of government control. Here's my *tax deductible* contribution of

_____$100 _____$50 _____$25 _____$10 _____$ other

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____STATE_____ZIP_____

N2

To: THE PACIFICA FIRST AMENDMENT FUND
c/o Pacifica Foundation/Box 8455/Universal City, CA 91608

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the tale, the short story is, to his mind, an abbreviated novel. In any case, he writes about the story as though Chekhov, Mann, Kafka did not exist, though he also wrote perhaps the best single essay on Kafka and was, I suspect, haunted by him. He even begins his essay with a story about Potemkin, who was once undergoing one of his paralyzing depressions and paralyzing the state as well. A petty clerk, Shuvalkin, decided to broach the problem directly, entered Potemkin's room with a sheaf of documents, and emerged triumphantly with them signed, only to discover they had been signed "Shuvalkin . . . Shuvalkin . . . Shuvalkin." The story, Benjamin writes, "is like a herald racing two hundred years ahead of Kafka's work. The enigma which beclouds it is Kafka's enigma." He uses several other stories to illustrate the range of the doomed transactions of Kafka's cosmically burdened characters with the world and its authorities, but he does not deal with Kafka as a storyteller so much as the creator of a theatre in which, like the classical Chinese, happenings are reduced to gestures, though in Kafka's case generally incongruous, enigmatic, confused or futile ones.

But certainly Kafka was a storyteller of the there and then, and there is probably no better illustration of Benjamin's favorite kind of story in which the elements of myth and fairy tale interpenetrate the natural than Kafka's "Metamorphosis." To be sure, Kafka is without counsel and there is no more perfect witness than his protagonists to the profound perplexity of the living in the midst of life's fullness, no author who has carried the incommensurable to a further extreme. And yet Kafka was full of stories, and even parables, myths, and fables.

I agree with Benjamin about the humanist usefulness he finds to be the story's defining ingredient, but believe that it can be conveyed by other means than the counsels of the there and then. The contemporary short story is typically concerned with here and now, particularly in cultures like ours in which the new, the perplexing, the ominous, the random, is our central universal. It is no accident that the storytellers of the there and then are largely found today in Latin America, where the past still flows through and shapes the present, often tragically so. I believe that the usefulness of the contemporary American story lies precisely in fighting for the human scale of experience and its communication against the forces that seek to diminish and trivialize it. I find that most stories that interest me accept the incommensurability of experience and struggle against it to make sense of the otherwise senseless, to locate the possibilities of coherence (in both senses of the term) in the otherwise incoherent flux of a society whose members are dazed by its mutability and by the babbling of its media about this "event," that "trend," who offer not knowledge of life but its momentary, abbreviated version—knowingness.

From this faith in the use of the story derives most of the standpoint from which I have selected the following stories. Though I try to remain open to innovation, I am more likely to respond to it as content—the opening up of fresh areas of common experience or the reclamation of banal ones through a strongly felt and rendered point of view—than as new ways of telling a story. The nonlinear anti-narrative generally leaves me cold and impatient, since for all of its air of defiance, it is usually playing society's game, refragmenting what contemporary life is already tearing asunder—the delicate membranes that join body, mind, heart, spirit—and dining out, as it were, on the incoherent. I am also skeptical of surrealism, "irrealism," "surfiction," etc., unless it has discernible lines of wit and emotion that ground it in shareable experience. Otherwise it becomes as banal and arbitrary as any other form of writing that offers no resistance to its own assumptions, and as tedious as listening to other people's dreams: consciousness without a context. I also have an indisposition to elaborately wired narratives that do not have much of the current of life at a critical point running through their circuits, and to obliquely told stories that cleverly chart a series of thematic coordinates and leave you to draw the line of meaning between them. I think the human situation is too interesting and urgent to turn it into literary games. By the same token, I am also skeptical about narratives that wish to be admired for their reticence, their decorum, that are squeamish about risking the unruliness of emotion and evasive about their convictions.

Hence I am disposed toward stories with a strong narrative movement that clearly gets somewhere, perfectly to a point that is both unpredictable and right—a bull's-eye at 400 yards rather than at 10 feet. Whether a story deals with a subject as large as the Holocaust, such as Leslie Epstein's "Skaters on Wood," or as small as the mute grief of a salt-of-the-earth workingman, such as Mary Ann Malinchak Rishel's "Staus," I want it to do justice to it and not dirt, to enrich my awareness of the life they are writing about and not cheapen or twist it into some reductive or inflated meaning. If it deals in perversity, as does Ian McEwan's "Psychopolis," or Gil Sorrentino's "Decades," I don't want to settle for still another bit of dabbling in the kinkiness of the age—but insist that the story earn its keep by its complexity of interest. Just as I do with a "positive" story, like Tim McCarthy's "Windmill Man," which affirms the life of a straight-arrow builder by his devotion to the skills and integrity of his labor that lead to his death.

Confronted by a story whose material is as seemingly banal as Lynn Sharon Schwartz's "Rough Strife," which deals with the rifts in a marriage occasioned by a first pregnancy, or L. Hluchan Sintetos's story "Telling the Bees," in which a country woman tells about her affair with a sociology professor, I want to be made to feel that I haven't, more or less, been here before, not because the writing is particularly "experimental" but because its freshness of perception and depth of feeling are. On the other hand, if a story comes in from left field, as does Jonathan Baumbach's "The Return of Service," a fantasy of a man playing tennis against his father who is also the umpire, I ask that its inventiveness not absorb the content—leaving me dazzled but empty, but the other

A FORM OF ASKING

Lord, if my quail have disturbed you,
they do not know it is late
November, and they are
once more to look for food.
If I am mistaken,
if I could see you leisurely
aloft a cloud, your left arm
casting the right
across mountains and lakes,
I'd give you back
the eyes of my face. Then
would I have known hymns
retune each heart to each.

In a circle and together, the quail
embody themselves each
facing where to fly next.
For myself, I lean
toward the unassuming blue
trim of a wood home, and one
woman, of inner modesty, humming
dear one, we will sleep
and wake with our names.

Lord, if I go blind with happiness,
I'd whir, and give you mostly away.

Mark Rubin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way around—leaving me struck by a new way of examining an old truth. As Benjamin would be, I am particularly impressed by stories such as Robert Sorrells's "The Black Top Champion of Ickey Honey," Mark Helprin's "The Schreuderspitze," Elizabeth Cullinan's "A Good Loser," Joyce Carol Oates's "The Translation," or Stanley Elkins's "The Conventional Wisdom," whose situations are so interesting in themselves and whose issues are so distinctly dramatized that I can retell the story to a friend in attenuated form and still see his or her eyes light up with interest.

In general, as you may have gathered, my approach to a story is usually dialectical. If it is as gorgeously lyrical as Harold Brodkey's "Verona: A Young Women Speaks," a young girl's account of the happiest time of her life, I want that lyricism to be tested by its opposite, in this instance the shakiness of her parents' marriage, the canker already forming in the rose. Similarly, I was impressed and moved by the way Joyce Williams plays off the instability of a young mother against the steadfastness of her parents, the one reinforcing and illuminating the other, while leaving the psychological disparities open to speculation about the mysteries of parenting. Similarly, I was bowled over by Peter Taylor's "In the Miro District," in which the steadily mounting antipathy between two members of a family—a boy cast in the mold of the Southern gentry and his maverick grandfather—and its eventual resolution, both centers and charges a study of manners and their effect on character, which for all of its leisurely storytelling tone is as hard and multifaceted and luminous as a diamond.

Well, that's about what I have to say in defense of the contemporary short story and the examples of it I have chosen. They have been arranged in an order which hopefully will provide what little continuity an anthology can have, and part of the reader's interest may lie in finding connections and resonances between them as he goes along. But mainly they should be read on their own terms. And if I have only touched on the stories themselves, and only on some of them, this also is because each of them speaks articulately and forcefully and justly for itself. That is why I have chosen it. □

Copyright © 1978 by Houghton Mifflin Company.

Everything that Rises

AIRSHIPS. *By Barry Hanna. Alfred A. Knopf. 224 pp. $8.95.*

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO GARP. *By John Irving. E.P. Dutton. 448 pp. $10.95.*

MICHAEL MALONE

In America everything merges. And so, possibly by the same secret corporate current that consistently (and, they claim, coincidentally) elects identical covers for *Time* and *Newsweek*, everyone reviews the same books. On a trail of blurbs, reviewers race together like lemmings into a sea of print. Happily, this month's flurry of garlands is falling upon two talented young authors, Barry Hanna and John Irving, for two very impressive books, *Airships* (Hanna's third publication) and *The World According to Garp* (Irving's fourth). Praise for *Airships* or *Garp*—or for both together, as in the recent front-page *New York Times Book Review*—has appeared by now in all the major periodicals. I'm glad. Both deserve all the praise they can get. They deserve anything that will carry them across the bridges of Manhattan to the tables of a thousand Waldenbooks, and so to readers. They deserve even the overpraise they are getting because we are so thirsty for good *fiction*, for the art of storytelling, because we so much want the pleasure of encountering true (and therefore original) invention, vision and voice, that only superlatives can express our gratitude.

At present Irving's novel is being more triumphantly publicized than Hanna's short stories, but that generic advantage is offset by the fact that on the page Hanna has more force, in fact, explosive force. He has kicked free of the visible thematic scaffolding through which Irving's people have to climb. In an ultimate, though not obvious way, Hanna's stories are fused together thematically; the tactic is reminiscent of Faulkner's *Go Down Moses*. Individually, they are beautifully built, but the construction work is so organic that he didn't have to leave the braces showing. It is that excess timber that clutters Irving's fine story: sometimes we can't see the house because the architect won't stop lecturing us on how he built it. Hanna lets us look for ourselves.

More writers have been smuggled out of the South than cartons of cigarettes, and Barry Hanna is one of the best. After two novels (his first, *Geronimo Rex*, was a National Book Award nominee), he now gives us a collection of stories that has already amazed James Dickey, exhilarated Denis Donoghue, and lured the word "masterpieces" from Philip Roth. And rightly so. His feel for this fictional form is amazingly sound—perhaps more so than in the slower narrative of the novel; his verbal exuberance and comic energy do exhilarate, and when tools and material work together, Hanna can make you a masterpiece. He can, as he says of a saxaphone, "get up into inhumanly careless beauty . . . get among mutinous helium bursts around Saturn." Reading *Airships* is like having lightning shark down at you in the dark. It illuminates where you are. It can scare you half to death.

Within all the raucous, lyric, sly, spooked, and innocent voices of his people, Hanna's voice is unmistakable. Not that he never makes mistakes: the violence in "Coming Close to Donna" and "Quo Vadis, Smut?" is stylistically uncontrolled, and the capstone endings smack of the worst of *Esquire*. But almost always, his writing is pure and easy because perfectly self-confident. It slides on the edge of excess with a playful ease; there is, as he said of a brilliant tennis player, "something peaceful in the violent sweep of his racket." His characters' lives may be small, but their voices are loud and large. Lost in a New South that is everywhere and nowhere any more, Hanna is always reaching, with the communal hunger of his heritage, back into the past (the Civil War), out into the future (apocalyptic *Gotterdammerungs*), and up to the universe: "My jealousy went out into the stars of the

Michael Malone is the author of two novels, Painting and Roses Red *and* The Delectable Mountains *(both Random House), and the forthcoming novel* Dingley on the Rampage *(Viking Press).*

The inside story of America's richest family, written with full, confidential access to (but not the *blessing* of) the *key* surviving Mellons. **"This is a lucid and balanced portrait of the Mellon family, with all its fascinations and its failings."**
—DANIEL SCHORR

THE MELLON FAMILY

A FORTUNE IN HISTORY
BY BURTON HERSH

159 photographs $14.95
Selected by the Book-of-the-Month and Fortune Book Clubs

WILLIAM MORROW

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

night above me." "My heart was big. Sometimes like I thought it would just burst and spring its nerves into the dark that would not care. . . . " "His gaze . . . penetrated the careless heart of nature, right in there to its sullen root." But the center hasn't held; there's rarely a reply. From the past, a young Confederate, holding a gun on an old Union soldier, screams at him, "Tell me the most exquisite truths you know. . . . Why is God such a blurred magician?" Terrified, the old man urinates in his pants. He has no answer. "Man, even inspired by death, simply foams and is addled like a crab." In the present, most of us are deaf and dumb, or pretend to be. And the future? A woman prostitutes herself to obtain a seat on a rocket that is escaping the end of the world. But the rocket lands on a swamp near Newark. "What outer space? Nobody has that much fuel left."

Hanna's tools (technical and thematic) come out of a Southern kit: the "Gothic" humor that is like sculpting gargoyles on Piggly-Wiggly stores, the lush rhythmic, almost incantational prose, the vocal quality of the writing. Point of view is almost always from a first-person narrator, or more precisely, a raconteur. Hanna, in the Twain tradition, is what he calls "a great liar," a teller of "big loose ones." It is this oratory of hyperbolic Southern voices telling their largely luckless tales that reminds reviewers of O'Connor and Welty, but Hanna is more secular and less furious than O'Connor, and he's more romantic and less forgiving than Welty, though he does have the latter's sweetness of heart, her delight in the vitality of survivors, her faith in love that isn't "just a nasty slipping-around thing between us, but a thing of the heart." But, of course, the author with whom all Southern writers must come to terms is Hanna's fellow Mississippian, Faulkner. Hanna takes the master on directly. He even evokes "the old verities" credo of the Nobel Prize speech. The woman in "Escape to Newark" says, "I myself had a suspicion there were some old verities. We used to go down to the pond and throw some bread at the ducks. They always reminded me of the old verities, so white and natural. Robinson even at his worst claimed he was wandering toward the ancient basics, but he was scared numb that he might have found them already."

Like Faulkner, Hanna is compelled by the past ("My sense of the past is vivid and slow"), but it is a painful, uneasy compulsion ("Memory, the whole lying opera of it, is killing me now"). In fact, when the protagonist of "Pete Resists the Man of His Old Room" is suddenly confronted at home by a crazed former roommate who slobbers at him, "I'm just a walking reminiscence. . . . I remember you when you were skinny and cried about a Longfellow poem," Pete blasts the man, the past, with a shotgun. The New South doesn't want to remember: "We're happy. The great questions seem to have passed us by. . . . Our children are beautiful and I've got stock in Shell."

But, also like Faulkner, Hanna is moved by *macho* romanticism, though he fights the impulse to pant after Faulknerian courage and pride and honor and sacrifice and etc., in their Colonel Sartoris manifestations. The battleground for Hanna's fight is in Faulkner territory, in the character of the Confederate General, Jeb Stuart, who figures centrally in four of the twenty stories, and always ambivalently, both as glorious hero and as murdering fool. "Knowing He Was Not My Kind, Yet I Followed" is told by a soldier who worships Stuart yet threatens to shoot him when he raises his saber to kill a wounded Yankee "in the grand old style." The soldier likes war, but hates killing: "It makes me sick when we kill them or ride horses over them. My gun is blazing just like the rest of them, but I hate it." In Stuart's tent, he oversees a letter the General is writing his wife: "The only thing that keeps me going," the letter concludes, "is the sacred inalienable right of the Confederacy to be the Confederacy, Christ Our Lord, and the memory of your hot hairy jumping nexus when I return." The shift in diction here is Hanna's stink bomb tossed at the grand old style, at the grand old cause. Stuart's assassin is the central character of another story. "You shit!" he screams at the hero. "What are we doing killing people in Pennsylvania?"

Or Vietnam? Quite specifically, Hanna ties our Civil War to the one in Southeast Asia, and so the Old South to the New, for in both those sorry messes Southern Americans, black and white, found "all we had going was the pursuit of horror." The young officer who narrates "Midnight and I'm Not Famous Yet" (which is as good as anything in *Going After Cacciato*) concludes in tears, "my life had gone straight from teen-age giggling to horror." When he captures a North Vietnamese army general who is an admirer of "Robert E. Lee, Napoleon, and Jeb Stuart," he honors the man. "We had a real romantic here and I didn't want him laughed at."

THE DIVINER

The danger surfaced in the fontanel.
I held your head on my arm,
whispering lullabyes into your sweet hot neck;
by the second week that was forbidden.
Then you swam alone
on your white sheet. Robed, masked,
I put my face as close as I could get it
to see what the sickness pulsed and signalled.

* * *

When I was little,
my father used to light a Lucky
and blow warm smoke, like a secret,
into my sore ear. I was amazed
it never escaped through the other ear,
nor any orifice Mother peered into—
to be housing the breath of my father!

* * *

Now you are growing and closing
everywhere against me.
The melded hemispheres of bone
have sealed my small window
as I pace the dry ground with my wand,
trying to hold the stick without bias,
trying to learn what the surface will not tell,
until the green wood plunges, nearly twists
from my grip: there's water here—
but how much? and how deep?

Ellen Bryant Voigt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But he is forced to napalm the general, thereby also killing the American he was trying to save. Throughout this story, the officer keeps thinking of an old golf champion, a better hero. Let us, he says, glorify the conflict of play, let our wars be in sport: "Love it! Love the loss as well as the gain. Go home and dig it. Nobody was killed. We saw victory and defeat, and they were both wonderful." Despite the killing and the kooks, despite the way things drive him crazy, Hanna is, finally, neither a nihilist nor even a confirmed cynic. Finally, he's a lover and even a patriot. "You don't have to get up next to the stars in your black jet to see America the beautiful."

If *Airships* is a race across a mined terrain, *The World According to Garp* is a long wait outside an intensive care unit where people you love are on the critical list. Irving has an acute and sustained sense of the fragility of life that is Keatsian in its painful power to make us feel how "in the very temple of Delight veil'd melancholy has her sov'ran shrine." Loss is inevitable, capricious accident and stolid death omnipresent, we are all—in the book's final phrase—"terminal cases." By the time I was halfway through this Jacobean plot of freakish mutilations and bizarre deaths, I was afraid to let our 2-year-old out of sight. By the time I finished, I couldn't sleep for fear the phone would ring to tell me someone had died. If this be the affective fallacy, it is extraordinarily effective. But *Garp* is more than a *memento mori*. It is a book "about" sex roles, about parents and children, about fame. It is a portrait of an artist from strange conception to stranger death. It is a study of a man's relation to, and understanding of, first, women, and, second, his work. Because Garp's work is creating fictions, the world according to Garp is built upon the juxtaposition between life (created by women, vulnerable to pain and death) and art (created by the imagination, and invulnerable). With anger, chagrin and laughter, Irving anatomizes the inadequacies and injustices of traditional sex roles. Sexual assault is the focusing symbol; the outrage of rape obsesses Garp. The sensitivity to women in this novel does not involve an imaginative leap into the female psyche such as Flaubert or Tolstoi attempted. Here, the force behind a memorable gallery of women characters—foremost among them, Garp's famous feminist mother and his English professor wife—is not empathy but deep, frustrated sympathy.

Garp, then, has more themes than a college fiction course, which is one reason why it would be a good book to teach. The other reason is that it's a good book. The short story, "The Pension Grillparzer," which the novelist, Garp, rightly suspects is the best thing he ever wrote, and which I suspect is the best thing in *The World According to Garp*—and further suspect Irving may think so too—is a beautiful fiction. The function of the imagination in forming fiction is obviously an issue of deep interest to Irving. He makes it part of the novel's subject matter: we are given not only Garp's life (told in the straightforward manner of a good 19th-century novel, rich in plot and characterizations) but homilies by Garp on writing and writers, as well as examples of his work—all of which, except "Grillparzer," comment directly on Garp's life.

The technique is different from the self-reflective fictions on fictionality of, say, Borges, for Irving is playing not with language but with plot. While some of his involutions are illuminating, or at least titillating (the story of how "The World According to Bensenhaver"—a sensationalized miniature of the Garp story of which we are given the long opening chapter—made Garp rich and famous even seems to predict the success of *The World According to Garp*), finally they are scaffolding. They stand between us and Irving's truest gift, his ability to tell a story that draws us into a world and holds us willing captives there. It is Irving's "terminal cases," his people, and not Garp's theories, that survive in our memories.

At one point Garp says he isn't a "natural writer," he has to work at it.

We don't mince words.

In the age of "People," gossip, TV news-as-entertainment and the proliferation of non-news features in leading news publications, **The Nation** continues to focus on the issues.

SUBSCRIPTION FORM

I enclose $_____ payment for:

☐ 1 year (47 issues) $21.00 ☐ 2 years (94 issues) $37.00

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Send to: ☐ Gift subscription 1 year $18.00

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

THE NATION
333 Sixth Avenue, New York, NY 10014

Add $1.00 per year for Canada and Mexico; add $2.00 per year for all other foreign subscriptions.
Foreign Subscriptions: Equivalent U.S. Funds

6-10-78

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Irving should learn he doesn't need to work so hard. If the magic of "Grillparzer" is any indication, his instincts know exactly what they're doing. That comedy and death may be intrinsically joined, that horror and joy may meet, and pleasure turn to poison "while the bee-mouth sips," are truths that fiction should not explicate but embody. As Hanna's stories do. □

DANCE / Nancy Goldner

Mikhail Baryshnikov's production of *Don Quixote* "after Petipa and Gorsky" is a spit-and-polish job on what is by now, 109 years after its first conception by Petipa, a battered artifact. If this description sounds less grandiose than the flourish with which American Ballet presents *Don Quixote*, it nevertheless falls within the grand tradition of Russian dance history. After Petipa, just about every Russian ballet master whose job it was to whip up novelty, if not new choreography, laid his hands on it. Revamping someone else's material was the prerogative of choreographers; indeed, written into Alexander Gorsky's first contract as ballet master with Moscow's Bolshoi company was the stipulation that he could revise the Petipa classics but could not choreograph from scratch. *Don Quixote* was the first scaffolding he took on.

Because legalized stealing is so endemic to Russian ballet, its repertory standards become reflections of Russian political and aesthetic history. This is the prime fascination of Baryshnikov's *Don Quixote*, for *Don Quixote* is the prime reflector of change. The story begins with Petipa himself, who revised it when he transferred it from the Bolshoi theatre, where it premièred in 1869, to the Maryinsky theatre in St. Petersburg. From the Moscow production he excised much of the Spanish local color, including "authentic" Spanish dances he had learned while traveling in Spain, and much of its peasant humor. For the Maryinsky he transformed its essentially bourgeois framework into something more aristocratic, which in concrete terms means the addition of many more classical variations and a whole new last act of *divertissement* presided over by two trumped-up characters, a duke and duchess. Petipa might have been courting the more refined tastes of St. Petersburg audiences, as history books tell us. He might also have been asserting his belief that ballet is allegorical, its plot a pageant of variations of which the most brilliant and difficult are reserved for the heroine. That the heroine of this ballet happens to be an innkeeper's daughter is circumstantial to Petipa; the fact that she dances at the top of a pyramid of dances puts her at the top of the heap in all other ways.

When Gorsky did *his* Petipa *Don Quixote* in 1900 he dismantled the pyramid shape and put back much of the local color, incident and detail that Petipa had taken out. And, apparently, then some. From what one may learn from books and intuit from an occasional snatch of extant choreography, Gorsky was interested in bringing to the ballet stage the illusion of reality for which Stanislavsky was striving in the theatre. Petipa's pageants obviously have no place on the realistic stage; nor does his rather strict dichotomy between dance and mime or his hierarchy of ballerinas, soloists, demi-soloists and ensemble. For Gorsky the crucial component of ballet was the crowd, a very well-directed crowd, a crowd of individuals some of whom danced more than others. Plot was not to be a rickety contrivance supporting variations; it was to be so managed that each time a character danced, a little of the plot would also get an airing.

Needless to say, this dramatically expressive choreography had to be controlled so that the significance of its content did not overextend the particulars of character, milieu and incident. When the hero of *Don Quixote* is not the Don but Basil, a barber, and when the heroine is not Dulcinea but Kitri, a street-wise concierge who wants to marry Basil instead of the fop her father is foisting upon her, severe limitations are placed upon the realistically inclined choreographer. Even if Gorsky did not take his credos literally—the differences between Stanislavsky theatre and the medium he was working in are too deep to overcome—the trend of his thinking led him away from the meticulously wrought variations of Petipa. Gorsky broadened the niceties of classical technique, thickened its texture. While he sought to enrich Petipa's handling of space and loosen his stratification of roles, he simplified the steps themselves, reducing Petipa's complex syntax into an emblematic display of classical poses connected with landfill. Whether Gorsky forsook subtlety of language for the greater emotional freedom a reduced syntax could give dancers, I don't know. It has been said that Moscow audiences always liked splashy dancing in which the performer had plenty of elbow room for temperament. One knows from current Bolshoi productions by Grigorovich that this is so today. Gorsky was much more bound to Petipa style than Grigorovich, and in any case must have been a greater choreographer by far. Nevertheless, it's in Gorsky's *Don Quixote* and its Baryshnikov offshoot that one sees Russian ballet tipping from virtuosity to grandstand plays, from exquisitely fashioned unreality to the coarse propaganda of a Grigorovich. Gorsky's *Don Quixote* was a big hit. It brought down the curtain on the Petipa era. The Russians knew it, and most of them wanted it that way. It marked the ascendancy of the Bolshoi over the Maryinsky—California over Boston. To this day the Soviet Union has still not found its New York.

The Baryshnikov version carries vestiges of both Petipa and Gorsky without the fully realized virtues of either. Following the modernization treatment Gorsky gave to Petipa, Baryshnikov has taken out the stylized mime and all the slow-going passages that were calculated to give audiences and dancers a respite from intense, brilliant dancing. However, Baryshnikov's streamlining goes much further than Gorsky's. He has turned *Don Quixote* into a veritable suite of dances, its pacing (and Patrick Flynn's reworking of the Minkus score) as zingy as a Bob Fosse show. While the suite structure brings Baryshnikov back to one aspect of Petipa theatre, and to the aspect that defines modern ballet, the brilliant choreography that justified Petipa's "string of dances," as even his detractors had to admit, is missing. Act I of this *Don Quixote* is a wham-bang sequence of banalities. It runs on adrenalin, aided by hard-driving conducting in the pit. Act II centers on a classically choreographed vision scene in which the Don confuses Dulcinea with two women he has met on the corner, one of them Kitri and the other a street dancer. Vision scenes, bearing no relationship to reality in the first place, have remained unbudgeable in the hands of those who would bring Petipa down to earth. As a convention, then, this vision comes to us intact. Although a wonderful relief from the nonchoreography of Act I, its choreography looks wispy, diluted, at the very best modeled after Petipa. The other scene in Act II returns to the banality of Act I, except for a solo Baryshnikov made for himself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It's a highlight of the entire ballet, because of the triple-barreled motivation that the dancing Baryshnikov bestows on it all at once—a put-down to a rival in love, a charming flirtation with two goblets, and a technical showpiece for himself. Another Basil, Jonas Kage, performed it as a technical challenge, no more. Kitri and Basil's wedding *divertissement*, which closes *Don Quixote*, is again one of those Petipa conventions only the most fanatical devotees of plot-dance unity would dismantle. This *Don Quixote* includes it, but so abridged and at times so diluted stepwise that it hardly attains the grand-finale effect to which it aspires. Despite all the classical tutus Santo Loquasto wisely designed for the wedding act, and despite, too, the very glamorous and thrilling *pas de deux* for Basil and Kitri, this celebration is from the provinces, without Bolshoi largess or Maryinsky class.

Gorsky's reforms do not enlighten this production either. The ensemble isn't lined up à la Petipa, but neither is it the living organism Gorsky wanted. The ensemble hangs around. All the human touches, details of *mise en scène* and homey, proletarian sensibility get swept away by the Baryshnikov tidal wave of entrances and exits. The famous local color and wealth of character dancing that Petipa played down in his second version and Gorsky reinstated are here reduced to nightclub Spanishisms. It is at about this point that the Baryshnikov *Don Quixote* tips from harmless inanity into wrong-headedness.

Both of the Kitris I saw, Gelsey Kirkland and Yoko Ichino, took the ferociously arched backs and titillating fans —indeed, even the series of flings into split jumps that is the ballet's choreographic signature—as metaphors for harsh personality. Both Kitris were bitches, which hardly sets the stage for a comic ballet. It was especially distressing to see Kirkland so technically glorious yet tight in spirit, choking on the extraordinary flourish of her jumps when she could have been exulting in them. So what if those jumps are a nightclub routine. So what if Gorsky is not Balanchine's *Theme and Variations*, to which she had given her mind as well as muscles the week before. In an interview Baryshnikov called *Don Quixote* classical vaudeville. It is difficult to elevate Kitri's variations to that category, but a few Russians have done it through good will and, I suspect, professional savvy. That as superb and experienced a dancer as Kirkland is yet not sophisticated enough to slum with aplomb is deeply disturbing. That she confuses soubrette sauciness with brittleness, as she and other ABT ballerinas do also in *Coppelia*, is annoying. (Strange how the Spanish Kitri and Galician Swanilda end up twin sisters from the wrong side of the tracks at ABT.) But the most unhappy aspect of the Kirkland conundrum is that the natural reticence that five years ago could be passed off as wonder-child innocence is now turning into professional virginity. Counteracting reticence with snappish temperament is no solution.

Baryshnikov's *Don Quixote* boils down to Baryshnikov as Basil. The absolute brilliance and charm and magnanimity and humor of his Basil is no small distillation. The ratio between *Don Quixote*'s ups and downs is about one to ten, but if I were a paying member of the audience I'd head for the nearest scalper. □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

We can agree pretty easily that universities and colleges on one hand and museums and galleries on the other are parts of a single knowledge industry. The interest in contemporary art shown by students and teachers, compared to the past and compared to present-day Europe, is phenomenal. All those note takers at exhibitions are a sign that the programs of education and the art market are not antagonistic. It is not only studio majors who frequent current shows; art history majors are as likely to be there. The fact that these latter are visible in the art world is itself revealing. It suggests not only that they are interested in contemporary art but also that they want to reach beyond library resources.

For this one cannot blame them: the library facilities on many campuses are a joke, with scarcity on two levels, first in the holdings, second in the number of copies. (Essay topics are often determined by what happens to be available in thinly stocked libraries.) The presence of students in galleries and museums means that magazines, catalogues and slides are not the sole source of information. There is a physical and social implementation of the act of reading. To attend galleries and museums is not only to consult original works of art, it is also to practice the use of the distribution system. Since most writing on contemporary art takes the form of reviewing, student access to the source is important.

Aside from students in the galleries, a great deal more contact takes place between student and artist/art work. For instance, I teach at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, and in the spring semester the following events occurred in two undergraduate classes. In a 400-level seminar the class visited the studio of Mary Miss and heard a talk by Linda Howard on her own exhibition at Sculpture Now. One student gave a report on Frank Stella's *forthcoming* sculpture (she had access to the metal shop where the pieces are fabricated) and another interviewed Kenneth Snelson. Two other students reported on a public sculpture in progress in Smithtown by Athena Tacha. The point is, such contacts are not isolated.

In a 300-level course on recent American art several students cued by shows at the Louis Meisel Gallery and the Whitney Museum of American Art, elected to write about Audrey Flack and Duana Hanson. Thus the current exhibition program, in the absence of sufficient resources provided by libraries, becomes an important point of reference. One student in the same class was on hand a couple of weeks ago to help Alan Sonfist at the ground breaking of his "Time Landscape," an example of his use of natural phenomena as public sculpture at La Guardia Place, north of Houston Street. It is on the open site in front of the Grand Union. (New York of course is an exceptional resource for nearby colleges and universities, but in other cities a similar predisposition toward artist-student contact may be discerned.)

There is two-way traffic: visiting artists go to campuses for a day or a semester, or for periods in between. These visits may be equivocally received by the resident artists (who sometimes feel pedestrian by comparison with flashy guests), but the visitors are part of a wider pattern of student-artist contact. The point is important, because the artists who teach full-time may be regarded less as artists than as teachers —sometimes, it must be admitted, correctly. Teachers are often ex-artists. Thus for role models outside the curriculum, visiting artists or visits to studios and galleries are essential.

Apprenticeship programs are medieval in name only (the word implying a protracted, hierarchic relationship). The modern apprenticeship is a form of mobility, however, of quick and intimate contact. The student works with an artist for a semester for five credits. Re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cent examples from my own campus include apprenticeships to Diana Kurz and Arnold Newman. The Empire State Program, open to juniors and first-semester seniors on recommendation from State University campuses, has been arranged to provide a semester's sustained contact with the professional art world of New York. There is a condition of returning to the home campus afterward, designed to insure the flow of news and information to the rest of the student body. (I am grateful to Mel Pekarsky for discussing this with me.)

It sounds at times as if it is the function of a college education to guarantee jobs for its graduates and when this occurs it is terrific. When it does not occur, as now, there is no reason to assume the university is useless. One of the functions of higher education is to habituate students toward their culture. In the case of art departments this involves a double direction: (*1*) toward appreciation of the work of art as an object, and (*2*) toward a grasp of the art world as a social network. The formal approach, if separated from the sphere of use, seems insufficient. The double approach is not the same as a job guarantee but it does amount to orientation to a real situation.

Thus the proliferation of students' contacts with artists and with the distribution network, though outside the traditional curriculum, realizes a central aspect of the university's function, the transmission of culture. As the art world becomes accessible on these terms, certain risks arise. Students may be infatuated by creative individuals at the expense of the intellectual potential of their art, but this can be guarded against, not least by the artists themselves. The bohemian and seerlike styles of an earlier generation have been largely replaced by a more complex professionalism. Thus artists now have more to say to students that students can understand and use. □

INDIGENOUS MUSIC/ Nat Hentoff

I have never anticipated any musical event as hungrily as, in my growing-up years, the annual Duke Ellington concert in Boston's Symphony Hall. The band was in town on other occasions, mainly for dances and theatre appearances, but the winter concert was so special that it was intensely discussed and replayed in memory until the next one. On those nights, Duke would present his newest extended work and sometimes a subtly different version of the previous year's major addition to the canon—as well as new shorter inventions and familiar set pieces for the titans of the orchestra who, being improvisers, would astonish us anyway.

On one of those evenings, in 1943, Boston was paralyzed by a blizzard. Public transportation had been shut down, and even the hardiest cabdrivers had retreated from the huge drifts and punishing wind. Living clear across the city from Symphony Hall, I just walked, for no act of nature was going to deprive me of Duke's exhilarating surprises. I was only worried, as I whistled Ellington themes against the gusts, that so few of us might turn up that the promoters might cancel the concert and refund the tickets. When I got to Symphony Hall, as I should have known, the place was jammed, and scalpers were doing a brisk business amid the gales outside.

Duke made a small circuit of these annual concerts, usually playing Carnegie Hall in New York and Chicago's Civic Opera House as well as Boston. And I always wondered if anyone would ever issue recordings of these events, for even during the recording ban of the early 1940s, there must surely have been resourceful *aficionados* who took home more than memories. Particularly missing from Duke's official discography was a full-fledged version of his nearly fifty-minute-long *Black, Brown and Beige*: "A Tone Parallel to the History of the American Negro." An unprecedentedly ambitious jazz work, its forms were as indigenous as its sounds, and it spoke directly and deeply from what later was to be called black consciousness. Yet there had only been truncated and rather pallid excerpts from it on commercial records, and the bootleg versions were also only echoes of the work's vibrant fullness as remembered from those annual concerts.

But now, *Black, Brown and Beige* is finally available—in its entirety—on the first of a series of Prestige sets, *The Duke Ellington Carnegie Hall Concerts*. This initial, three-volume jazz landmark was recorded at the 1943 concert (with a short passage inserted from that year's Boston concert). The band was one of the best Ellington ever assembled—with Johnny Hodges, Ben Webster, Harry Carney, Rex Stewart, "Tricky Sam" Nanton, Lawrence Brown. And it was surely "up" for this night—playing with glorious authority, in spirited knowledge that no orchestra in jazz could come close to matching its expressive range and the extraordinary *presence* of its compellingly distinctive soloists. And, of course, all the players knew that they were charged with interpreting the most challenging body of music in all of jazz, written by Duke with each one of them specifically in mind.

In addition to *Black, Brown and Beige*, there are new perspectives on such other classic Ellington compositions as *Ko-Ko, Black Beauty* (a portrait of Florence Mills), *Cotton Tail, Jack the Bear, Boy Meets Horn* and *Portrait of Bert Williams*. Any collection of serious American music without this set is culturally deprived.

Of the other *Carnegie Hall Concerts* on Prestige, the 1944 event is very much worth having if only for trombonist Nanton's eerily human "plunger" solo on *It Don't Mean a Thing If It Ain't Got That Swing*, but there's much else of perennial value besides. The 1947 concert has more substance than 1946 but every Duke concert is worth having on record.

Ellington stopped that special annual concert circuit in 1950 because, he said, "By then everybody was giving concerts." Duke was not everybody, and many of us lamented the fact that we no longer had that one resplendent evening to look forward to each year. But from now on, I shall at least be able to play the 1943 album on a winter's evening of my choosing; of the four Prestige sets, that's the one which most vividly reminds me how privileged I felt walking through the worst of Boston weather to get to a fulfillment beyond category. □

classified

$1.50 per line / 2 line minimum/ 6 words (45 characters or spaces) per line/ Payment in advance must accompany all orders for less than three consecutive insertions. Classified Display: $20 per inch/ one inch minimum. Send to The Nation, 333 Sixth Ave., N.Y.C. 10014.

PUBLICATIONS

"TECHNOCRACY—Technological Social Design" available for one dollar from Technocracy Inc., Continental Headquarters, Savannah, Ohio 44874.

READ THE GUARDIAN—newsweekly gives Marxist viewpoint on national and international news. Special 6-week trial subscription, $1. Full year $17. GUARDIAN, Dept. N, 33 West 17th Street, New York City 10011.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CARIBBEAN-WATCHERS! Probing, comprehensive coverage by monthly newsletter of nations in, bordering Caribbean. Special $12 yearly. Samples $1. Caribbean News, 507-G Fifth Avenue, NYC 10017.

FREE SAMPLE: The New International Review, a quarterly journal of democratic socialist theory. Original articles, book reviews, reprints, new translations. A high-quality publication you've got to see to believe. Box 163, Rosedale, N.Y. 11422.

READ UNITE!, twice-monthly newspaper of the Marxist-Leninist Organizing Committee. Covers trade unions from the revolutionary viewpoint of the proletariat. No other U.S. periodical reports on the Black and Chicano struggles for national self-determination or the battle of women against special oppression from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Subscriptions: $8 per year. Two sample copies: $1. UNITE!; Dept. N; Box 8041; Chicago, IL 60680.

AREAS OF CONCERN—Harry Hyde's newsletter for concerned citizens. Free sample (mention **Nation**): AOC, Box 47, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010.

EDUCATION

YOUR CHILD'S COLLEGE. What should you know? Pamphlet. $2 check/M.O. Oneota Valley, 612 Ridge Rd., Decorah, Iowa 52101.

INSTRUCTION

SAXOPHONE LESSONS
with composer/performer
$15 per hour
(212) 532-8826.

RUSSIAN!
Speak, Read, Write—all levels
212/989-4266

AUTHOR'S QUERY

WE ARE COLLECTING one million dollar ideas for a book entitled WHY DIDN'T I THINK OF THAT? Here's a perfect showcase for that unbuilt building, that unproduced device, that unexecuted scheme. Write: Ideas, Box 481, Canal Station, New York City 10013.

HELP WANTED

AMATEUR SINGERS WANTED
Nightclubs, concerts, records, band, record required. Must speak English. Manager (212) 974-9300.

PERSONALS

SINGLE BOOKLOVERS gets cultured, single, widowed or divorced persons acquainted. Est. 1970. Nationwide. Write Box AE, Swarthmore, PA. 19081.

SINGLE? Nationwide introductions! Identity, Box 315-TN, Royal Oak, Michigan 48068.

MISCELLANEOUS

SALE of CURRIER & IVES Travelers Calendars. Frank Nee, 16 Durant Ave., Maynard, MA 01754.

Ask About Our Low Rates For Display Ads

Crossword Puzzle No. 1730

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 A friendly fellow, perhaps unfairly associated with insignificance. (6,5)
9 Evidently father's not out with a headache, for example. (4)
10 Such a word is used only on occasion. (5)
11 and 30 Left at sea, and purported to be in Egypt. (4,4)
12 Dad goes to town, which is classy, but not enough! (7)
13 A little shiner for one who is hoping to take part. (7)
15 The drinking establishment gets sort of clean, but that's what Bill is associated with! (8)
16 Is it a quiet boost when you get it?
18 and 14 down He contributed to George's reputation for awesome integrity. (6,5)
21 See 20 down
24 It wasn't necessarily a pressing time, long ago. (4,3)
26 There's a bad scare about a foreign politician in this movement (7)
28 See 20 down
29 One of those things you kick over in rebellion, or at least some indication of it. (5)
30 See 11 across
31 9 across? It might get spread! (6,5)

DOWN

2 and 19 A book for other than experienced travelers? (9,6)
3 This has to pertain to the motion. (7)
4 Once said to be a coming American. (4)
5 Not the kind Armstrong said was small —many of us used to do it. (3-4)
6 Extra in the act, but extra-special for the young, if somewhat dated. (5)
7 How to suppress collections of miscellaneous information? (Don't put it in cold storage, we are told.) (6)
8 Movements of rather weird types, as they say—belonging to a group somewhat out of favor after Watergate. (6)
14 See 18 across
17 Sagebrush, for example, or what opera stars sing about bad times. (9)
19 See 2 down
20, 28 and 21 The musical subject is spirited—alternatively 21 might be bare. (5,2,4,8)
22 It's not quite obvious a transposition of the first two letters might make it powerful. (7)
23 What Debussy did with Portugal and Spain. (6)
25 The lowest point suggests one sometimes considered the crusading type. (5)
27 —it's also "strike violently", "adulterate", "sketch hastily", "race", etc. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1729

ACROSS: 1 and 5 Pickwick Papers; 10 and 15 Alternatives; 11 Prompters; 12 Dentist; 13 Prattle; 14 Frugal; 18 Panamas; 21 Angels; 24 Rostrum; 26 Tellers; 27 Turncoats; 28 Leave; 29 and 30 Common interest. DOWN: 1 Plaids; 2 Cut and run; 3 and 4 Working capital; 6 Asphalt; 7 Event; 8 Suspense; 9 Coupon; 16 Volte-face; 17 Operatic; 19 Morocco; 20 Sampan; 21 Artisan; 22 Galilee; 23 Aspect; 25 Strum.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The magazine that helps you keep time . . .

"An extraordinary magazine," says the **St. Louis Post-Dispatch** "It supplies a margin of safety in a world where that margin has become slim and equivocal."

"Its subscribers girdle the globe," says **Time.** "They muster more scientific, diplomatic and statesmanship credentials than any world conference in Geneva."

"A lot of us lean on it," says **George Wald,** the Harvard Nobel laureate.

Since the end of World War II, when it came into being with the dawn of the nuclear age, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* has been keeping time with its Doomsday Clock, which measures mankind's ability to come to terms with its immense capacity for self-destruction.

From the very first, it was, in Albert Einstein's words, "the most complete source of authoritative information on the social aspects of atomic energy." That reputation continues. But now the Bulletin has also become a leading source of information and commentary on the full range of issues involving human survival in a technological age.

The promise and the pitfalls of solar energy. The impact of military research and development on the arms race. The unfolding revolution in the biological sciences. The pressures of poverty and population growth. The challenge of new techniques for preventing environmental degradation. Wherever science interacts with public policy, whenever science interacts with the needs of society, the Bulletin serves as the conscience of the international scientific community.

To the scientist, the Bulletin is a forum for discussion of the uses to which science and technology should be put. To the nonscientist, it is a window to scientific thought about public policy questions. For many, it is a source of information and ammunition with which to advance their causes.

Always lively, always authoritative, always hopeful despite the grimness of the problems which crowd in upon us, the Bulletin is a magazine for you.

And now it can be yours at a substantial saving. Take advantage of this limited-time offer. **Write today.**



Some recent Bulletin articles:

- Plutonium Economy: Why We Should Wait And Why We Can Wait
- Why Not Build The House Right In The First Place
- Energy Efficiency: Our Most Underrated Energy Resource
- Sewerless Society
- Planned Parenthood For Pets
- Is Nuclear Energy Acceptable?

A special offer

When you enclose payment with your subscription we will send you *FREE* one of the following audio cassette tapes from the series, *Sounds of Great Ideas.* Regular price $12.00

1. MARGARET MEAD: How People Change (25 min.)
2. ROBERT FROST: An Evening with Robert Frost (55 min.)
3. JACOB BRONOWSKI: The Ascent of Man (55 min.)

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
1020–24 East 58th St.,
Chicago, Ill. 60637

☐ Yes, I want to save $3.00 from the annual subscription price and $5.00 from the annual newsstand price. Please send me a free audio cassette tape and enter my subscription for one year. (I enclose $15 payment.)

Name _____

Address _____

_____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

N1

Send tape no. 1 2 3 (circle one)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED